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The Contested Commitments of Property
JANE

B. BARON*

The means by which property organizes human behavior and social life is the subject
of profound and heated debate. On one side, information theorists emphasize that
property works in rem, using standardizedsignals to tell all the world to keep off things
owned by others. On the other side, progressive theorists emphasize property's capacity
to promote human flourishing, respect for human dignity, Aristotelian virtue, or
democratic governance. The divide between these two schools of thought represents the
most vital dispute in a quarter-centuryof property scholarship, but this Article claims
that this divide is not adequately understood.
Debates between informational and progressive scholars currently center on whether
the right to exclude is fundamental to property law. By contrast, this Article suggests
that academics' singularfocus on exclusion has obscured even deeper questions about
property's stability, its institutional mechanism for change, and its very status as a
distinctive field of study. Rather than pursuing unproductive controversies over what
lies at property's "core" and "periphery," this Article presents a different metaphorical
contest as a more accurate account of the issues in modern property law. Information
theorists employ the metaphor of property as a machine-a machine that, with minimal
tinkering, has produced a good-enough social ordering and will generally continue to
do so. This mechanical metaphor contrasts with progressive theorists' view of property
as a conversation. The conversation metaphor expresses the view that we need to
continually question whether the system is good enough, that we need to openly debate
the quality of the human relationships that property produces, and that we must revise
property rules that fail to fulfill our underlying value commitments. This metaphorical
contest is important doctrinally because it reflects conflicting views about whether we
can ever unreflectively trust property rules to express our values. "Machine" and
"conversation" suggest very different visions of how much faith we should have in our
existing system of property and of whether we can trust ourselves to improve it.

* I. Herman Stern Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law. I am grateful to
Hanoch Dagan, Robert Ellickson, Henry Smith, and others who read an early draft of this paper in
connection with a Property Works in Progress conference held at the University of Colorado Law
School in June 2oo9. For comments on later drafts, I thank Gregory Alexander, Craig Green, Rick
Greenstein, David Hoffman, Duncan Hollis, Gregory Mandel, and Andrea Monroe. All errors are
mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Property organizes human behavior and social life. The manner or
means by which it does so is currently the subject of debate more heated
than one might expect in a field conventionally considered as sleepy as
property. On one side of this debate, information theorists posit that
property works as a social ordering system-and attains its status as a
distinct area of law-by providing clear signals recognizable to all the
world about how to behave with respect to things owned by others. In
order to be clear, property's signals must be simple and largely
standardized. On the other side of the debate, progressive theorists
suggest that property encourages and reflects such attributes as human
flourishing, respect for the humanity of others, Aristotelian virtue, or the
for participation in democratic governance.
rights requisite
i. On progressivism generally, see Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive
Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2oo9). Along with Professor Alexander, the Statement was written
by Eduardo M. Peflalver, Joseph William Singer, and Laura S. Underkuffler. For reasons described
infra note 72, I include Jedediah Purdy among the progressive scholars. The specific claims of
progressive scholarship are examined infra Part I.B.
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Incorporating these qualities would substantially complicate property
law. In the eyes of progressive theorists, this complication is a good thing,
for it ensures that property will produce relationships that are
qualitatively valuable.
Much contemporary property scholarship frames this basic divide in
property theory in terms of exclusion.2 The central question for property
law and theory, in this view, is whether the right to exclude is
fundamental to what it means to have a property right. Certainly
exclusion plays a central role in information-based theories of property;
under those theories, it is in rem exclusion rights that distinguish
property from other fields of law and thereby constitute property's
exceptional way of ordering the social world.3 There is also no denying
that progressive theorists, among others, have worked hard to
demonstrate that exclusion does, and should not, play the central role
that the information theorists advocate.4 Property is less about exclusion,
progressive theorists argue, than about relationships and values.
Excessive focus on exclusion in their view only distracts us from
conversations we should be having about the quality of our social life.
Exclusion is thus currently perceived as the central fault line in
property law and theory. This debate over its centrality plays out
doctrinally in arguments over whether trespass is property's paradigmatic
rule, as opposed to, say, the implied warranty of habitability or other
similar rules that tend to require fact-specific judgments and that were
created with explicit concern over the balance of power between owners
and others.5
2. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 596 (2oo8) ("The idea of
exclusion, in one form or the other, tends to inform almost any understanding of property, whether

private, public, or community."); Hanoch Dagan, Exclusion and Inclusion in Property 8 (June 9, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=141658o. "Exclusion is in vogue in
property discourse.'7 Id. at 2; see also Elizabeth M. Glazer, Property's Contingent Right to Exclude i
(June 2oo9) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal) ("Property law's right to
exclude has taken on a life of its own.").
3. See infra Part I.A.

4. Progressive theorists do not argue that exclusion is irrelevant to or trivial in property law, but
rather that exclusion does not play the defining role suggested by information theorists. See, e.g.,
Gregory S. Alexander, Reply, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. io63, 1070 (2009)

("The core of ownership is more complex than the right to exclude standing alone."); Dagan, supra
note 2, at 8 ("[E]xclusion or exclusivity can exhaust the meaning of property and thus be properly
described at its core only if we set aside, somewhat arbitrarily, large parts of what constitutes property
law...."); Glazer, supra note 2; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORoro L.J. 275, 277-78 (2oo8); see also Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public
Accommodations and PrivateProperty, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1295 (1996).

5. Information and progressive theorists have explicitly debated one another over this issue.
Compare Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information,
II6 YALE L.J. 3742, 3745 (20o7) ("The exclusion strategy protects rights-holders' interests in the use of
resources indirectly, by using a simple signal for violations. The prototypical example is trespass to
land. .. ), with Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property Law, 94

92o0
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The debate also plays out in metaphor. Interestingly, information
and progressive theorists alike describe property through the trope of
core and periphery.6 But they "fill" the core quite differently. In the eyes
of the information theorists, exclusion constitutes property's core, while
for the progressive theorists human relationships constitute the core.
This division of views about property's core, which parallels the doctrinal
dispute, has helped keep exclusion at the front and center of property
theory, where it seems likely to preoccupy scholars (and their students)
over the next generation.
This Article argues that a different metaphorical contest underlies,
and more accurately defines, what is and ought to be debated.
Information theorists employ the metaphor of property as a machine-a
machine which has long served to produce more or less on its own goodenough social ordering and which, with some restrained engineering, will
continue to produce such ordering. This metaphor is inconsistent with
the progressives' metaphorical view of property as a conversation. The
conversation metaphor expresses the progressive theorists' view that we
need to question whether the system in fact is good enough, that we need
to debate-openly and continually-the quality of the human
relationships that property produces, and that we must commit to
redefine property rules that fail to fulfill the values for which the
property system should stand.
The machine and conversation metaphors reveal more clearly the
contested commitments of information and progressive theories with
regard to the manner in which property produces social order.
Information theorists are mainly interested in the mechanics of the
property system, in how it works logistically. Progressive theorists are
mainly interested in the outcomes the property system produces: in what
social relations it constructs. Until recently, the two strands had tended
to talk past their differences over the relative importance of the how as
opposed to the what, but these commitments cannot be reconciled. The
rich discussions of plural values that progressive theorists regard as
necessary to ensure that property reflects democracy, promotes freedom,
and advances human flourishing will not send the simple signals that are,
in the eyes of information theorists, central to the functioning of the
property system. The standardization and formality that makes the
property system "go," informationally speaking, are inconsistent with the
range of conversations that progressive theorists believe should be taking
place. Between the informational and progressive views of property,
there is underexplored and undertheorized friction over the relative
L. REv. 745%775-81o (2009) (describing a variety of property doctrines that are not based on
exclusion and that instantiate social obligation norms).
6. It is not clear that progressive theorists would have chosen the core/periphery metaphor had
information theorists not emphasized it so heavily. See generally Alexander. supra note 5CORNELL
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importance of clear signals (and the coordination they enable) as
opposed to explicit consideration of social values (and the conversations
such consideration enables) in property law. This friction is important
doctrinally because it reflects conflicting views about whether we can
ever unreflectively trust property rules to express our values.
The metaphors of machine and conversation require us to judge the
quality of the status quo. If, as the information theorists assert, property
has worked and continues to work well enough at providing the
coordination we need to live together happily and peacefully, then not
much needs to change. Our existing system of exclusion-based rules,
applied in a straightforward manner, will provide us all the human
flourishing, freedom, and other values that we require. Here and there,
we may need to pay special attention to a particularly knotty nuisance
dispute or to consider how to address newer forms of property, such as
property in information. But these are exceptional situations, and their
solutions may only require assimilating them as best we can to existing
property rules.
If, on the other hand, the progressive theorists are correct that our
current system of property has the potential to create a world of injustice,
then we have a problem we need to address openly and explicitly. As
progressive theorists note, many people do not have much property at
all; some people who used to be owners are now losing their property to
foreclosure and many owners, such as landlords or members of
community associations, routinely exert power over their tenants and
neighbors. These issues are not, for the progressive theorists, exceptional
departures from a basically good-enough baseline, but part of the
baseline itself. If the baseline is problematic-if it fails to foster values
about which we care, such as freedom and equality-then we need to
talk explicitly about that, and to consider whether to act expeditiously to
fix it. And even if the current baseline were not immediately
problematic, we would still need to discuss whether it serves all the
things we value; rules can never do the work of explicit conversation
about the ends property achieves.
Whether our social world is good enough is not a trivial question.
The machine and conversation metaphors suggest quite different answers
to it. Property surely does something in our social order. What it does is
the issue. This Article examines the conflict between the information and
progressive theorists in hopes of addressing precisely that question.
After a brief survey of the principal claims of information and
progressive theories, I begin the examination of property's contested
commitments by canvassing contemporary debates over the utility of the
bundle-of-rights metaphor for property. Although the "bundle of rights

922
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picture of property"7 has never been universally accepted,8 recently the
"bundle of rights" metaphor has become particularly controversial. The
dispute about the bundle of rights metaphor centers on whether just
anything can be put in the bundle and on whether the constituent parts
of the bundle can be changed at any time. For information theorists, the
problem with this suggestion is that it misrepresents the way that
property functions and what makes property a distinct legal category,
one unlike any other field of law. For progressive theorists, in contrast,
the problem with the bundle-of-rights metaphor is that it does too little
to dislodge conventional notions that ownership necessarily requires
consolidation of a wide range of powers in a single owner. Moreover, the
bundle metaphor does not enable the right kinds of conversations about
values. The debate over the bundle-of-rights metaphor thus provides a
window into contested commitments over the way that property
functions, over the way in which it is legally exceptional, over its stability,
and over the proper institutional mechanism by which changes in
property should occur.
These contested commitments lead to another previouslyunexplored divide, over what might be seen as complexity. Information
theorists focus on the principle known as numerus clausus, which posits
that the universe of property forms, i.e., the estate system, is closed and
that it should remain so because of the tremendous information costs
that would be imposed if parties were free to create just any kind of
property rights they might desire.9 While progressive theorists do not
take direct issue with the numerus clausus principle, the values they wish
to further cannot be vindicated in the standardized, stripped down form
information theorists value. We see here a largely unacknowledged
dispute about the optimal level of complexity in property law; the more
7. See J.E. Penner, The "Bundle of Rights" Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 714
(1996).
8. Among other problems, it conflicts with what Bruce Ackerman calls the "Ordinary
Observer's" understanding of property, rooted in "the ordinary talk of non-lawyers," see BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION io (Yale Univ. Press 1977), and with what Joan
Williams calls the "intuitive image," which emphasizes property's "absolutism," see Joan Williams. The
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 280-95 (1998). It has been attacked as normatively empty,

see Penner, supra note 7, at 714 ("[T]he bundle of rights ... schema [does not] suggest any clear
methodology for dealing with property issues."), as incoherent, see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix
Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregationof Property, 93 MICH. L. REv. 239, 243 (1994)
("[A]lthough its proponents usually present the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor as an alternative to the
'property as thing' metaphor, the former is in fact merely a variation of the latter."), and as
dysfunctional, see Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, xo8 YALE L.J. 1163, 1I65
(1999) (noting the potential of the bundle theory to create overly fragmented anticommons property).
Finally, as noted infra note 29, the "bundle of rights" theory potentially renders every "stick" in the
bundle a separate property interest, capable of being "taken" in the Fifth Amendment sense by
government regulation that reduces or eliminates it.
9. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optirnal Standardizationin the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, no0 YALE L.J. I1(2ooo).
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rights or sticks included in the property bundle, the less clear and
standardized property will be. In pressing for incorporation of difficultto-define qualities such as virtue or flourishing, progressive proponents
of these qualities implicitly assert that the values of simplicity and
formalism in property law do not exhaust the field.
After examining these contested commitments over the nature of
property rights, I turn to rights' correlatives, i.e., to the treatment of
duties in contemporary property theory. For scholars who understand
property primarily in terms of information, duties are highly salient;
information theorists thus deeply value property's ability to signal clearly
to nonowners their duties, in effect, not to touch or enter. Progressive
scholars focusing on flourishing, virtue, and democracy, in contrast, are
less apt to discuss duties directly, and are more apt to find duties
problematic.'0 I argue that these divergent approaches to duties reflect
disagreements about the role of distribution and about the pace of
change in property theory. Information theorists argue that our existing
property system has functioned in more or less the same way-and very
successfully-for a very long time, and that we should be reluctant to
tinker with it. Change, if it is needed at all, should come from the
legislature, which is apt to change things slowly and to compensate in
some way any losses such changes cause. Progressive theorists, in
contrast, would debate openly whether the property system is in fact
working successfully, and how "success" should be defined. Their focus
on the quality of social relations that the property system creates leads
them to be far more open to quick interventions to improve the system,
and far less concerned with the institutional mechanism by which those
improvements might be achieved.
Finally, I take up the metaphors that have structured the debate
between the information and progressive theorists. "Core" and
"periphery" have been openly contested. Less obvious, but perhaps more
important, are competing metaphors of "machine" and "conversation."
Information theorists are happy to be engineers focused on the
mechanics of the property system. Progressive theorists are loathe to
think or talk about property in mechanical terms, for fear of foreclosing
discussions they regard as critical to ensuring that property serves all the
right values all of the time. In one view, property is already working well
enough as a social ordering device; in the other, the quality of the
existing social order must be continually and directly challenged.

io. As explained infra Part III.A, progressive theorists focus less on the duties of nonowners to
owners (which are central in information theories) and more on owners' duties to nonowners and
other members of their communities. Putting this another way, information theorists tend to be
concerned with "negative" duties, such as duties to "keep off." Progressive theorists are concerned, in
contrast, with whether owners might owe "positive" duties, such as a duty to permit access.
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Part I introduces information and progressive theory. Part II uses
the dispute over the bundle-of-rights metaphor as a vehicle to unearth
the contested commitments of the two theoretical strands with regard to
property's functional exceptionalism and with regard to the optimal
degree of complexity in property law. Part III moves to contested
commitments over duties, redistribution, and the pace of change. Part IV
explains why the machine/conversation metaphor reveals more
accurately than the core/periphery metaphor the commitments that are
contested in contemporary property theory. Machine and conversation
suggest very different visions of how much faith we should have in our
existing system of property, whether it is good enough, and whether we
can trust ourselves to improve it.
1. INFORMATION AND PROGRESSIVE THEORIES OF PROPERTY

This Part briefly introduces the main claims of information and
progressive theories of property. Information theorists argue that
property works as a distinctive system by providing clear signals to all the
world about how to behave with respect to property owned by others."
Progressive theorists have proposed a variety of other ends around which
property rights can be organized." Although the progressive theories are
in some senses quite different, they have in common the attempt to
ground our system of property on values other than the transaction costs
and externalities of information. The range of progressives' values is
extremely broad, and that breadth, as we will see, creates a potential for
conflict with the relatively simple signals information theorists value.
A.

PROPERTY AS INFORMATION

In a series of influential articles, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith
have outlined a theory of property based on the need for information.
Put simply, "[p]roperty is a device for coordinating both personal and
impersonal interactions over things. Consequently, property rights must

ii. See infra Part L.A.
Without purporting to be exhaustive, I survey theories offered by Gregory Alexander,
Eduardo Pefialver, Jedediah Purdy, and Joseph Singer. See generally Alexander, supra note 5, at 748
(flourishing); Eduardo M. Pefialver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) (virtue); Joseph
William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1009, 1047 (2009) (democracy); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-PromotingApproach to Property: A
Renewed Tradition for New Debates. 72 U. Cm. L. REV. 1237 (2005) [hereinafter Purdy, A FreedomPromoting Approach]; Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the
Freedom-PromotingApproach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007) [hereinafter Purdy, People as
Resources] (respect for humanity of others). As explained supra note i, Purdy did not sign the
Statement of Progressive Property. Nonetheless, his work reflects many progressive themes, and he is
described by at least one of the Statement's signatories as a fellow progressive. See Singer, supra. I take
no position in this Article as to whether the theories offered as part of the statement are actually
progressive in the political or historical sense; I simply adopt the authors' own label.
12.
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be communicated to a wide and disparate group of potential violators." 3
The need to communicate information explains why property rights are
rights in rem: "[A]n in rem right, good against the world, is more than an
arbitrary bundle among many other similar bundles. It is a key shorthand
method of delineating rights that saves on the transaction costs of
delineating and processing information about rights in terms of uses and
users.,,' 4 The message must be delivered simply, which explains why
property operates through the limited number of forms recognized under
the numerus clausus principle:
To avoid violating property rights, a large and indefinite class of
dutyholders must know what constraints on their behavior such rights
impose. If the legal system allowed in rem rights to exist in a large
variety of forms, then dutyholders would have to acquire and process
more information whenever they encountered something that is
protected by an in rem right. If in rem rights were freely
customizable-in the way in personam contract rights are-then the
information-cost burden would quickly become intolerable.
The numerus clausus is best seen as a device to standardize property
rights, and thereby reduce the widespread information-gathering and
processing costs imposed on third parties by any system of in rem
rights."
Information costs explain not only the limitation on property forms,
but also why the property system so often depends on the right to
exclude. In a world of zero transaction costs, it would not matter how
rights were defined, for the parties would bargain to socially efficient
results regardless." But "[i]n the positive transaction cost world, some
shortcuts are in order."' 7
By giving A the right to exclude, one can economize along several
margins. First, the right to exclude need not refer to any specific use.
By giving A the right to exclude an unspecified group of others- all

13. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 185o (2007) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Morality of Property]. The tern "things" as used by
information theorists refers to intangible as well as tangible property. See Henry E. Smith, Property
and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1754 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property] (making no
distinction between tangible and intangible things).
14. Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, i J.L. EcoN. &POL'Y 69,79 (2005).
15. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?,
I I YALE L.J. 357, 387 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property] (footnote
omitted); see also Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105, 1147 (2003) [hereinafter Smith, Language of Property] ("[P]otential violators'
information costs bear on the design of the law. Property presents a simple message to the outside
world.. .. [T]he dutyholder only needs to know that he does not own the asset in order to know that
he must keep out. This keeps informational demands on the dutyholder to a minimum."(footnotes
omitted)). For more on the "measurement costs" faced by those seeking to avoid violating others'
property rights, see Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 26--42r6. Smith, supra note £4, at 77. This observation derives from Coase's well-known work. See R.
H. Goase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &EcoN. i (£960).
17. Smith, supra note £4, at 78.
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the rest of the world-A's interest in a wide range of uses...is
protected without the need for the one delineating the right to know
anything about ... these uses. Moreover, those who have to respect the
right-the duty holders-need not know anything about these uses or
about features of A. The duty holder need only know to keep off.
Finally, the one delineating the right need not know much about or
even the identity of the duty holders; the right is to exclude the rest of
the world.'8
Thus,
[P]ositive transaction costs help explain why we have property at all
instead of an elaborate system of contracting over much more specific
use rights to resources and activities. It is because of positive
transaction costs that we think in terms of things and especially in
terms of in rem rights to exclude others from them-i.e. those rights
known as property.'

There will, of course, be situations requiring more fine tuning than pure
exclusion allows. In these cases, "governance" supplements the exclusion
strategy.20 "The principal advantage of governance rules is that they
allow society to control resources in non-standard ways that entail
greater precision or complexity in delineating use rights than is possible
using exclusion." 2 ' For resources such as ocean fisheries, clean air, or
ideas "that are difficult to package into easily measured and monitored
parcels such as are required for exclusion strategies to work,"
governance rules have great advantages." But "[a]s the number of
individuals whose actions could potentially impact the resource
increases, it will be more costly to specify individual behavior according
to a governance strategy: The information costs of specifying which
individuals have the right to do what will simply become too great.""
Thus, in rem rights operating via the strategy of exclusion transmit
necessary information cheaply; they "offer standardized packages of
negative duties of abstention that apply automatically to all persons in
the society when they encounter resources that are marked in the
conventional manner as being 'owned."' 24 But these savings can only be

18. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Smith, Property, supra note 13, at 1754 ("Protection of a large
and indefinite class of uses by delineating a thing and giving the owner a right to exclude all others
from the thing is a strategy well suited to situations in which it is not economical to decide first-order
questions of use on a use-by-use basis.").
19. Smith, supra note 14, at 79.
20. Id. at 79-80, 87-89; see Smith, Property, supra note 13, at 1755-58. For an explication of the

basics of exclusion and governance, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies

for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL

STUD. 453 (2002).
21. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, ioi COLUM. L. REV.
773, 797 (2001).
22. Id. at 798.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 794-
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achieved if the message is kept simple;" thus the importance of the
numerus clausus principle. We need a "small number of standard forms"
imposing substantive rights that "will typically be immutable, meaning
that they are not subject to revision by agreement." 6 Moreover, the
message must be clear: "substantive legal norms associated with in rem
rights are more likely to be expressed as rules that turn on one or a small
number of publicly observable states of fact, and thus are formalistic or
bright-line in character." 7
B.

PROGRESSIVE THEORIES OF PROPERTY

i. Human Flourishing
Gregory Alexander argues that "[a]s a matter of human dignity,
every person is equally entitled to flourish. That being so, every person
must be equally entitled to those things essential for human flourishing,
i.e., the capabilities that are the foundation of flourishing and the
material resources required to nurture those capabilities."" Borrowing
from the "capabilities" approach developed by Martha Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen," Alexander argues that "[s]ocial structures, including
distributions of property rights and the definition of the rights that go
along with the ownership of property, should be judged, at least in part,
by the degree to which they foster the participation by human beings in
these objectively valuable patterns of existence and interaction." 30
No individual can acquire the capabilities or the resources necessary
for human flourishing by him or herself; we require others for everything
from the "physical process of human development" to the development
of capacities for "freedom, practical rationality, [and] sociality." 31rIn
short, "[w]e are ... inevitably dependent upon communities, both chosen
and unchosen, not only for our physical survival, but also for our ability
to function as free and rational agents." 2

25. Smith, Language of Property, supra note 1S, at I125 ("The communication of legal relations is

subject to a tradeoff between intensiveness and extensiveness of information: For the same cost, one
can communicate a lot to a small, close-knit audience or a little to a large, anonymous audience.").
26. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 802.
27. Id. at 8o3.

28. Alexander, supra note 5, at 768. The relationship between Alexander's notion of human
flourishing and the notion of human flourishing famously proposed by Margaret Radin in her article
Property and Personhood, is not entirely clear, but Alexander explicitly locates his vision in the
"Aristotelian tradition." See Alexander, supra note 5, at 760-68; Margaret Jane Radin, Property and
Personhood,34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
29. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 762 (citing MARTHA
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

(1985);

(2ooo);

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.

at 764.
at 765.
at 766.

AMARTYA

(1999)).

C.

NUSSBAUM,

WOMEN AND HUMAN

SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES
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Individuals' embeddedness in and indebtedness to community give
rise to obligations:
[A]n owner is morally obligated to provide to the society of which the
individual is a member those benefits that the society reasonably
regards as necessary for human flourishing. These are the benefits
necessary to the members' development of those human qualities
essential to their capacity to flourish as moral agents and that have
some reasonable relationship with ownership of the affected land.
Under this view, eminent domain, to take but one example, can be
understood in terms of "the social obligation" to maintain the
infrastructure-roads, airports, public buildings, communication
systems-on which all depend.3 4 Other restrictions on use-including
historic preservation laws, nuisance regulations, and the public trust
doctrine-can similarly be understood as required by the needs of the
community or its members.35 "The[se] obligation[s] imposed on owners
to sacrifice their property interests in some way can often be justified on
the basis of cultivating the conditions necessary for members of our
communities to live well-lived lives and to promote just social relations,
where justice means something more than simply aggregate wealthmaximization.
2.
Virtue
Virtue constitutes a related basis from which property may be tied
to obligation. The "virtue-based ethical theories in the Aristotelian
tradition," on which Eduardo Pefialver relies for his virtue theory of land
use, also draw on "a substantive conception of the human good or
flourishing."37 To some extent, virtue is a characteristic of an individual
person: "Virtues are acquired, stable dispositions to engage in certain
characteristic modes of behavior that are conducive to human
flourishing,"38 and "virtuous conduct" is "the behavior that flows from
stable dispositions to use land in ways that characteristically promote
human flourishing." 39
Yet, alongside its individual dimension, virtue also has an important
public or social dimension related to its recognition of the importance of
values in addition to those of self-interested wealth maximization. 0 Thus,
"virtue ethics' recognition of a plurality of values makes it particularly
well-adapted to provide a means for acknowledging and balancing an
interest in the aggregate welfare or wealth of society with a concern for
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 774.
at 776.
at 805.
at 819.

Peflalver, supra note
Id.

39. Id.at 876.
40. Id. at 867.

12,

at 864.
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the full spectrum of the other human goods that land-use decisions
implicate." 4 ' This public, or social, dimension of virtue has implications
for individuals' conduct as landowners and for the government's conduct
in regulating land use. Landowners and government alike must
demonstrate "the capacity to appreciate and assign the proper weight to
the many subtle and incommensurable values (including economic
values) implicated by their decisions."" In making land-use decisions,
then, cost-benefit analyses are only one part of the much larger set of
factors that owners and policymakers should consider:
Other questions, like the sustainability of the owner's use, the
possibility of irreversible or catastrophic future consequences, the
proper scope of owners' autonomy, or (most broadly) the relationship
between land-use decisions and other aspects of human flourishing,
may well trump a technically cost-beneficial course of action. . . . [T]he
need to consider such diverse values ... more faithfully reflects the
complexity and high moral stakes of much land-use decision making.43
Because human flourishing "is an unavoidably cooperative
endeavor,"" law plays a role in fostering human flourishing.45 In this role,
law may-and sonetimes should-override private decisions in the
service of a variety of goals. The goals include "protect[ing] those, such
as the poor and future generations, whose ability to flourish might be
harmed by owners' immoral decisions,"46 teaching owners "to act
virtuously of their own accord," 47 and "clarify[ing] social obligations
and ... coordinat[ing] collective virtuous actions."48

Specifically in regard to land, virtue imposes obligations on owners.
For example, "[b]ecause the system of private property as a whole is
established in order to facilitate the ability of members of the community
to flourish, owners' rights are qualified by an obligation to share from
their surplus property with those who need them in order to satisfy more
fundamental needs." 49 In other situations, the dignity interests, needs, or
dependence of third parties may obligate owners to forbear from
exercising their rights to exclude. 0 State v. Shack exemplifies the way in

41. Id. at 867-68.

Id. at 868.
43. Id. at 868-69 (footnotes omitted).
42.

44. Id. at 869.

45. Id. at 876.
46. Id. at 871.
47. Id. Pefialver cites nondiscrimination norms embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
"contribut[ing] to dramatic changes in racial attitudes." Id. at 872.
48. Id. For example, "environmental statutes or regulations... can help spread the word about
best practices to landowners already inclined to act responsibly but lacking information about the
remote consequences of their behavior." Id.
49. Id. at 88o.
50. Id. at 882.
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which virtue-based obligations sometimes limit the owner's power to
exclude.
3. Freedom
Property and freedom have long been associated with one another,
but the precise ways in which property can and does enhance freedom
can be difficult to specify." In two recent articles, Jedediah Purdy
approaches this problem anew." He identifies a "freedom-promoting
conception of property" that understands property as "a dynamic
institution, a set of rules evolving in response to technological and social
innovation, which applies a variety of types of claims to a variety of
resources." 54 "Members of this tradition," Purdy writes, "understand
property as a social institution in this sense: property regimes set the
terms on which people are able to recruit each other for social
cooperation.""

Alongside a distinct conception of property, Purdy articulates a
distinct conception of freedom, one also drawn from Amartya Sen. 6 This
concept "conceives of freedom functionally: to inquire how free people
are, it asks what they are able to do, which forms of human potential they
have turned into actual capabilities that they can in fact exercise."57 This
functional approach to freedom considers property regimes in terms of
their potential to "open or close practical altematives"' 8 and in terms of
whether they "promote relationships of domination and subordination,
which tend to inhibit self-assertion by the subordinated, or whether,
alternatively, they promote reciprocity and cultivate the habit of
recognizing and pursuing one's own interests and commitments in the
course of negotiating cooperation with others."" Specifically, "property
rights define how people can recruit one another, and the resources they

51. 277 A.2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971) (holding that entry onto a farner's land to offer services to

migrant workers housed thereon was not trespass, despite the fact that the owner objected to the
entry); see also Pefialver, supra note 12, at 883.
52. Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 208 (2oo2)
[hereinafter Baron, Expressive Transparency of Property]; Jane B. Baron, Property and "No
Property", 42 Hous. L. REV. 1425 (2006) [hereinafter Baron, Property and "No Property-]- Carol M.
Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996).
53. Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note x2; Purdy, People as Resources, supra

note

12.

54. Purdy, A Freedom-PromotingApproach, supra note 12, at
55. Id.

1243.

56. Id. at 1242 ("Today [the] theoretical underpinnings [of the freedom-promoting conception]
are experiencing a revival, most prominently in the thought of Nobel laureate economist Amartya
Sen.").
57. Id. at 1243.
58. Id. at 1244.
59. Id. at 1244-45.
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control, for collaborative projects.... This relationship may be more or

less reciprocal."160
Property law can enhance freedom by "directing interpersonal
recruitment toward relative reciprocity rather than hierarchy.... [A]n
important standard for assessing changes in legal regimes is whether they
move the terms of recruitment toward reciprocity . . . ."61 Slavery
represents the ultimate nonreciprocal relationship; 62 a regime of free
labor may move us towards reciprocity 6 although, depending on the real
alternatives viably available to the parties, reciprocity may or may not be
attained.6 4 The achievement of this end is, however, independent of the
form property rights take; "[t]he mere form of property rights" does not
guarantee freedom. 65
Depending on allocation and various dimensions of context, the
extension or intensification of property rights may be neutral or
negative in its effect on freedom. The point is to keep in view the aim
of promoting freedom understood as capabilities, and not to confuse it
with any particular institutional instrument that has successfully
promoted it in a particular context.t

4. Democracy
Joseph Singer has synthesized aspects of the models described
above into what he calls a "democratic model" of property law. Like
Alexander, Pefialver, and Purdy, Singer emphasizes the social quality of
property rights, considered in concrete terms: "Every legal right should
be understood not merely by reference to the powers and rights it gives
the owner but by reference to the impacts of the exercise of those powers
on others and the shape and character of the social relationships
engendered by those rights and powers."68 These relationships must be
examined qualitatively and, when they are, it will be clear that "[i]n a
free and democratic society, some relationships are out of bounds; this
means that some contract terms are off the table."69

In Singer's view, as in that of the other progressive theorists, the
relational nature of property rights gives rise to obligations -particularly
"an obligation of attentiveness" that requires owners to consider the
effects of their actions on others. 0 Indeed, property rules must generally

6o. Id. at 1285.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 12, at 1o59.
Id.at lo6o-68.
Id.at 1o68-79; Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 12, at 1251-65.
Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 12, at 1o97-98.
Purdy, A Freedom-PromotingApproach, supra note 12, at I 298.

66. Id.
67. Singer, supra note 12, at Io46-47.
68. Id.at 1047 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 1048.
70. Id.
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be evaluated for their effects: "we cannot conclude that a particular set of
property rules or institutions is acceptable unless we attend to the
systemic effects of exercising those property rights." 7'
If our property system is to be truly democratic, Singer suggests, we
will have to "consider some substantive limitations on the packages of
rights property law will recognize."72 In this regard, the common law
estates system functions "not only to lower the information costs of
determining who the owner is, but to shape social life in a manner
consistent with the normative commitments of a democratic society
composed of free and equal individuals who treat each other
respectfully." 73 But the classical common law estates system is only a part
of a more pervasive regulatory scheme in the realm of propertyincluding statutes governing fair housing, zoning, mortgages, and marital
property, to name a few. 4 These statutes are not mere add-ons to an
established core of common law property rights. Rather, they are part of
what defines the contemporary property system:
It is a mistake to think about property law in a manner that is divorced
from these statutory regulations. We use a combination of common
law, statutes, and social custom to define the boundaries of allowable
packages of property rights, and we will better understand the function
of property law in our economic and legal system if we broaden our
concept of estates to include the entire social and legal structure that
defines the property-rights system."
For information theorists, what is most interesting and important
about property is how it works, practically speaking. In rem rights,
operating through standardized forms, provide at low cost simple signals
that effectively protect owners' rights by signaling to nonowners their
duty to keep off. For progressive theorists, what is most interesting and
important about property is the outcomes it produces. Property is at least
capable of fostering human flourishing, virtue, freedom, and democracy
and should be judged by the success with which it actually fosters these
qualities. Of course, it is important not to overdraw the contrast. As
developed below,76 information theorists value in rem rights because, in
their view, such rights promote freedom; in the space from which
nonowners are excluded, owners pursue self-chosen ends. Information
theorists focus on how the system functions to create that space, whereas
progressive theorists focus directly on the system's results. As we shall
see in the next Part, these differing foci give rise to differing visions of
what makes property exceptional.
71. Id. at 1050.
72. Id. at ioo-51.

73. Id. at

10$51-52.

74. Id.at 1052.
75. Id.at 1o52-53.
76. See infra text accompanying notes

192-95-
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II. PROPERTY'S CONTESTED EXCEPTIONALISM
It has long been conventional to describe property as a "bundle of
rights."" The 1936 Restatement of Property used this term, it is discussed
in introductory property casebooks, and it appears prominently in
mainstream scholarship and judicial decisionmaking." While never
entirely uncontroversial,' in recent years it has come under particularly
heavy attack?.' This Part uses the debate over the accuracy and utility of
the bundle-of-rights metaphor to unearth some of the differing
substantive commitments of the two strands of property theory. My goal
is not to prove that property is or is not correctly conceived as such a
bundle. Rather it is to identify what is at stake in this debate for
contemporary property theory.
Some aspects of the bundle-of-rights metaphor are not
controversial. There is widespread agreement that owners have multiple
rights with respect to what they own,8 3 that property rights in a single
asset can be divided among people8 ' and divided over time,85 and that an
individual may have a variety of separate property interests in one asset.86
To the extent that this is all that is meant by depicting property as a
"bundle of rights," the term is not particularly problematic. In this
77. Dagan, supra note 2, at 2 ("The bundle-of-sticks picture of property.. . had for decades been
regarded as the conventional wisdom.").
78. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF PROPERTY §§ 1 4 (1936).
79. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 8I (6th ed. 2oo6) ("[T]he abstraction we call

property is multi- not monolithic. It consists of a number of disparate rights, a 'bundle' of them . . . .").
8o. Heller, supra note 8, at 1192 n.150 (reporting the increase in the number of cases using the
term, from four state and federal cases before 1940, to 775 cases between 1980 and 1999, when Heller's

article appeared).
81. See sources cited supra note 8.
82. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 79, at 81 n.4o.

83. For example, owners have the power to use what they own, to exclude others from it, to sell it,
to devise it, to grant others rights to use it, and so on. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:
RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 505 (4th ed. 20o6). ("An owner of a fee simple interest in real
property has the present right to possess and use the property, to sell it or give it away, and the right to

devise it by will or leave it to her heirs."). In the sense of being an agglomeration of separable powers,
property can be said to be a "bundle of rights." In this usage, the "bundle" metaphor emphasizes the
multiplicity of powers owners have. They can give and sell; they can keep others out and set the terms
on which others can enter.
84. Thus, different persons might own different physical interests in the same land, with separate
persons owning the mineral rights, the surface rights, or the air rights in a given parcel of land.
85. Thus, one person may own the right to present possession, and a different person own the
right to possession in the future, as is true in the case of leaseholds and life estates followed by
remainders. SINGER, supra note 83, at 493. In addition, multiple people may own interests in the same
property at the same time, via joint tenancy or tenancy in common. Id.
86. Take the example of a condominium owner who "'might have a 'fee simple' interest in her
unit's living space, an exclusive easement in her balcony area and parking space, tenancy in common in
the hallways and the swimming pool, defined participatory rights in the community's governance, and
so forth." CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HiSTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC
oF OWNERSHIP 280 (1994). The condo owner's rights are the sum (or "bundle") of these separate
interests.
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descriptive context, the bundle-of-rights metaphor "is in large part a
device for separating the various facets of property and for giving an
intuitive grasp of their separateness and moveability rather than their
interrelatedness and porosity."

As section A of this Part describes, however, matters get more
tricky when the bundle-of-rights metaphor is used in a second way-to
emphasize the social nature of ownership, i.e., the idea that property
rights are Gust) rights between or among persons. Here, the information
and progressive theorists alike take issue with the metaphor, although for
entirely different reasons. In the eyes of information theorists, insofar as
the social view of the bundle-of-rights diverts attention from things to
people, it is descriptively inaccurate and, more importantly, inattentive to
the unique way that property operates in rem to produce social
coordination. This objection implicates information theorists' views of
property's functional exceptionalism. For progressive theorists, in
contrast, the problem with the social side of the metaphor is that it is
insufficiently powerful to unsettle conventional, but in their view
mistaken, views of ownership as rights consolidated entirely in one
person. This objection implicates progressive theorists' commitment to
relentless focus on the relationships property produces.
Similar problems recur when the bundle-of-rights metaphor is used
in yet a third way, to describe historical changes in the form of owned
things-from tangible to intangible-that, in the eyes of some, render the
rights in the bundle entirely contingent. As section B explains, the
information theorists object to this view both descriptively and
normatively, based on their commitment to stability over change and on
institutional choice preferences for legislative rather than judicial action.
Progressive theorists find less problematic the historical view of the
bundle as contingent, for they are far more receptive to change and far
less concerned about its source than the information theorists.
In section C, I identify yet another set of contested commitments
between the information and progressive theorists. These raise issues of
complexity. The functional advantages of the existing system stem, in the
eyes of information theorists, from the relative simplicity of the signals
that our property system uses. But the bundles of rights contemplated by
the progressive theorists are not simple and, in the progressives' view,
87. Id. at 282. The metaphor might seem problematic insofar as it is inattentive to, or may even
weaken, "the sense that groupings of property rights might be interconnected and interdependent." Id.
at 280; see also Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 282 (2002) ("In this Article, I articulate a new understanding of

property as a web of interests, not a bundle of rights."). Yet, its disaggregative tendencies
notwithstanding, "the bundle of sticks is not just sticks but a bundle," and thus "the bundle metaphor
acts at least as much to 'package' the various elements as it does to give an impression of their
separateness." ROSE, supra note 86, at 282.
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should not be simple. Not only are the bundles of rights that the
progressive theorists contemplate "fatter" than the bundles
contemplated by information theorists, but they are never fixed; they are
always at least potentially in flux as the result of our need to evaluate
constantly whether they are serving the appropriate values.
A.

PERSONS OR THINGS?

Independent of the use of the bundle-of-rights metaphor to describe
property's fragmentation, the metaphor has frequently been used in
connection with the assertion that property rights are social. The idea
here, frequently traced to Wesley Hohfeld (who did not use the bundleof-rights term) is that property rights are relations among persons with
respect to things, not relations between persons and things themselves.88
Sometimes this idea is connected to historical changes in property forms;
to the extent that property has over time subsisted less in tangible things
(or land) and more in intangible interests, then 8 rights to property are
ever less accurately described as rights to things. 9 More frequently the
idea is used to highlight property's use as a mechanism to sort out
competing claims to resources, claims that arise between persons, the
resolution of which involve creating reciprocal relationships among
claimants. "[E]ach time the law protects one person's security, by
recognizing in that person a right (which imposes a correlative duty on
others) or a privilege (which imposes on others what Hohfeld called a
'no-right' . . .), the law unavoidably denies others corresponding

88. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note

15,

at 365 ("Hohfeld did

of rights' to describe property. But his theory of jural opposites and
not use the metaphor
correlatives, together with his effort to reduce in rem rights to clusters of in personam rights, provided
the intellectual justification for this metaphor . . .."); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 38
U. TORONTo L.J. 117, £20 (1988) ("[S]ince the writings of W.N. Hohfeld it has been generally agreed
that 'property' refers to legal interests that exist only as between persons, in respect of things."
(footnote omitted)). Hohfeld did write that "all legal interests are 'incorporeal'-consisting, as they
do, of more or less limited aggregates of abstract legal relations." Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
bbundle

FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913).
89. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 83, at 2 ("It is sometimes thought that property concerns power

over things. One problem with this definition is that many property rights do not concern 'things' at
all, but intangible resources, such as copyright or interests in an ongoing business."); see also GREGORY
S.

ALEXANDER,

COMMODITY

& PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS

OF PROPERTY

IN

AMERICAN

LEGAL

THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 381 (1997) ("Property exists in whatever resources have market value, and

increasingly in American society the most valued goods are not the tangible things but the intangible
interests, expectations, and promises."). Of course, intangibles can be "things." See supra note £3 and
accompanying text. On historical changes in property forms and the conclusions some have drawn
from those changes, see infra Part IB.
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security." 90 Put more simply, if owners have rights to control assets, then
nonowners have duties related to those rights."
It is not entirely clear how the term bundle-of-rights expresses the
rights-among-persons view of property rights; "bundle of relationships"
might come closer." Hohfeld's project was aimed less at formulating a
definitive idea of property" than towards achieving analytical and
terminological clarity about legal interests; he was particularly anxious to
attack the assumption "that all legal relations may be reduced to 'rights'
and 'duties."' 94 "Bundles of rights" were not, after all, bundles of
"rights," but rather bundles of more finely grained legal interests
("rights," but also "privileges," "powers," and "immunities") that always
came paired with a reciprocal interest (or lack of an interest) held by or
affecting another person. In the words of Bruce Ackerman, "each
resource user is conceived as holding a bundle of rights vis-a-vis other
potential users."95
Information theorists are among the large constellation of scholars
who believe that the conception of property as a bundle-of-rights
between persons is simply wrong. Property may have a social dimension,
these scholars argue, but the relationships with which property is
concerned are relationships with respect to things, broadly conceived.
Thus, in the words of J.E. Penner, "[p]roperty is a right to
things ..

.

. Property is a normative relation between an individual, or co-

owners, and others which has as its focus and justification the exclusive
determination of the uses to which a thing may be put."9 Or, in the
words of Emily Sherwin, "the first task of property law is not to resolve
disputes between people over resources, but to establish a relation
between a person and an identifiable thing, which predates disputes
between that person and others."' Or, as stated by Thomas Merrill and

90. ALEXANDER, supra note 89, at 320.
91. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 10 (2ooo) ("The right to
exclude nonowners, for example, regulates nonowners by requiring them to stay off the owner's

property.").
92. See Hohfeld, supra note 88, at 21 (describing property as an -aggregate of legal relations'
appertaining to a "physical object").
93. Property was simply a "striking example" of the "ambiguity and looseness of our legal
terminology." Id. Though many of Hohfeld's illustrations involved property, he noted that in the field
of contracts as well there was comparable "ambiguity and confusion." Id. at 24-25.
94. Id. at 28.
95. ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 26.
96. Penner, supra note 7, at 8o; see also id. at 8o8.
97. Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, xo86
(1997); see also Schroeder, supra note 8, at 292 ("Unfortunately, [Hohfeld] missed the point that
property is a relationship between subjects that is mediated through an object."). Schroeder argues
that "although its proponents usually present the 'bundle of sticks' metaphor as an alternative to the
'property as thing' metaphor, the former is in fact merely a variation of the latter." Id. at 243 (footnote

omitted).
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Henry Smith, "core property rights attach to persons only through the
intermediary of some thing."98
Scholars who believe the rights-between-persons view to be
inaccurate argue that it is inaccurate in a way that fundamentally
misunderstands and misstates the way in which property is unique. No
one has articulated this view so clearly or vehemently as Merrill and
Smith:
[P]roperty rights attach to persons insofar as they have a particular
relationship to some thing and confer on those persons the right to
exclude a large and indefinite class of other persons ("the world") from
the thing. In this sense, property rights are different from in personam
rights, such as those created by contracts or by judicial judgments."

To Merrill and Smith, the "in rem"" nature of property rights
differentiates property from other legal rights, especially contracts. And
to the extent that the bundle-of-rights metaphor's social emphasis
obscures this exceptional quality of property, it is affirmatively
misleading and misguided, for it obscures how property functions. As
Merrill and Smith explain, thinking of "bundles of rights" as just an
aggregation of in personam social rights "misses a fundamental aspect of
in rem rights. The duty to respect the property of others... has an
impersonality and generality that is qualitatively different from duties
that derive from specific promises or relationships.'o' As we have seen,
in the eyes of Merrill and Smith, property is fundamentally an
information system, sending easy-to-understand signals to the entire
world-comprised fundamentally of duty holders-to keep off what
others own. 0 2 "Things" are integral to the signals sent. To the extent that
the bundle-of-rights metaphor suggests otherwise, it impedes the correct
understanding of the exceptional manner in which property functions to
create social order.2 3
It is important to identify just what is at issue in debates over the
utility of the bundle-of-rights metaphor. If property were just a bundleof-rights between persons, then, at least in theory, those persons could
individually customize the bundles they wish to have. But Merrill and
Smith argue that this customization does not in fact occur. Property
bundles in reality come in a limited number of standardized forms, which

98. Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 15, at 359.
99. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
Too. On the in rem nature of property rights, see, for example, Smith, supra note 14, at 78-79, and
Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 786-87.
sol. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 787. Put another way, citizens A, B, and C have exactly the

same duties vis-a-vis an owner of a thing as citizens X, Y, and Z. Id.
IO2. On the importance of exclusion, see supra text accompanying notes 16-27103. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 787.
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the parties are not free to vary. This is the way in which the numerus
clausus principle operates.0 4
Nor, the argument continues, should the parties be able to
customize the bundles-at least not beyond the considerable flexibility
already permitted by the common law estate system.' The costs of
infinite customization are not borne by the parties creating them; to
reduce the burden of such externalities on outsiders, parties' freedom to
create just any bundle they choose must be curtailed.' "If in rem rights
were freely customizable-in the way in personam contract rights arethen the information-cost burden would quickly become intolerable."'07
Here we begin to see two of the key substantive commitments of the
information-focused theories of property. First, property is a system; like
any system, proyerty is governed by a "design principle," albeit an
"unstated" one.' It works in rem, and to do its work, it needs, inter alia,
things. Moreover-and this is a second commitment-property is
exceptional. It is different from contract or tort. To allow infinite
customization would undermine or even erase property's exceptionalism,
robbing it of its unique capacity to solve social ordering problems. What
is at stake in this part of the debate over the bundle-of-rights metaphor,
then, is the correct understanding of property's function and its very
identity.
Progressive theorists seem to agree that property is indeed distinct
from contract or tort, and that, to the extent that the bundle-of-rights

104. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 9.

105. Id. at 35 (describing the way in which, like language, the standardized building blocks can be
combined in complex ways).
so6. See id. at 8.
When property rights are created, third parties must expend time and resources to
determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating them and to acquire them
from present holders. The existence of unusual property rights increases the cost of
processing information about all property rights. Those creating or transferring idiosyncratic
property rights cannot always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs
fully into account, making them a true externality. Standardization of property rights
reduces these measurement costs.
Id.
107. Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 15. at 387. In a way, the information

theorists' antagonism toward the "bundle of rights" metaphor seems odd, because they concede that
the basic, building-block forms delineated by the numerus clausus principle-the common law
estates-are in a real sense bundles of rights. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 36 (referring to
common law estates as the "set of property rights bundles.") That is, even those who contend that
standardization is effectively mandatory do not dispute that the standard packages are bundles. Their
issue with the "bundle of rights" metaphor is mainly with its tacit or implicit suggestion that the
bundles can be altered at will.
io8. Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note s5, at 386.
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metaphor suggests otherwise, it is problematic." Progressive theorists
also share the information theorists' view that property is a system."0 But
progressive theorists do not really share the information theorists'
concern with the specifics of the way that property functions
exceptionally to coordinate social life. Rather, progressive theorists focus
on ends, and in this respect, the two theories' commitments diverge.
In contrast to the information theorists, progressive theorists do not
take issue with the proposition that property rights are social. As one
progressive theorist puts it, the legal realists were "correct in analyzing
property rights in terms of human relationships rather than relations
between persons and things."' The problem with the bundle-of-rights
metaphor is simply that it is not powerful enough to convince others to
see property that way. Nonlawyers, personified by Ackerman's
"Ordinary Observer,"" 2 "think it meaningful to talk about owning things
free and clear of further obligation."" 3 Precisely because it does not
conform to everyday beliefs, the bundle-of-rights view is incapable of
dislodging conventional understandings of ownership under which all
rights are seen as consolidated in a single person." 4 This understanding,
progressive theorists argue, is pernicious insofar as it creates
''unconscious presumptions" with respect to both who owns a particular
entitlement and, more importantly, who has the burden of justifying any
redistributive change in an owner's set of rights." Whatever ordinary
people may believe, the progressive critique argues, property rights are
not in fact consolidated in one person, and the sooner both lawyers and
the lay public come to grips with this fact, the better." 6
io9. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 12, at 1032 ("[T]he legal realist approach had its own problems.
Taken to its extreme, the bundle-of-rights idea could suggest that property has no meaning whatsoever
as a legal category. . .
n1o. See, e.g., id. at 1o49 ("[T]he democratic approach to property understands property not
merely as an individual right but a social system.").
iii. Singer, supranote 4, at 1461.
112. See ACKERMAN, supra note 8, at 10.
113. Id. at 26.
114. See Singer, supra note 4, at 1453 ("[T]he classical conception of property ... is premised on
the notion that property rights identify an 'owner' who has title to a set of valued resources with a
presumption of full power over those resources."). In Entitlement, Singer refers to this view as the

"ownership" model. See SINGER, supra note 91, at 3. Under the ownership model, as under the classical
model, we "typically presume that the owner has, not just one or two powers, but all [the] powers-a
full bundle-over the property." Id.
115. SINGER, supra note 91, at 9; see Singer, supra note 4, at 1459-60.
i 16. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality and Humanity in Property Regimes,
52 Loy. L. REv. 243, 272 (2oo6).
[O]wnership of property includes a bundle of rights and it is often the case that some of
those rights are limited to protect the legitimate interests of others. In effect, this means that
some of those sticks in the bundle are in fact owned by others and not the person we
conventionally think of as the owner of the property.
Id.
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But for the information theorists, consolidation is exactly what
makes property work, functionally speaking. The in rem right to exclude
all others from a thing delegates a large number of powers to (and thus
consolidates these powers in) owners, and this delegation is to be
celebrated in information-cost terms because it "allows owners to
undertake the choice among uses without having to justify the decision to
third parties" while it sends "a simple message to dutyholders-to keep
off."" 7 The information theorists' commitment to a functional view of
property-their emphasis on how it works logistically-relies on a vision
of consolidation that the progressive theorists reject.
This brings us to an important way in which information and
progressive theorists' commitments diverge. The information theorists
focus on how the system works, which is through exclusion rights with
respect to things. Bundles of rights are not and should not be infinitely
customizable, they argue, because idiosyncratically-bundled rights would
be too costly to process: buyers would not know what they were
acquiring, and third parties would not know what to do to avoid violating
newly created rights. But the progressive theorists' argument for limiting
bundles of rights is not based on function, but on ends; the "limitations
on the package of rights property law will recognize" are "substantive.""
Thus, "the reason we do not allow complete freedom of contract with
respect to property is because many forms of property contradict values
that shape the contours of social relationships in a free and democratic
society."" 9 In other words, progressive theory holds that "our working
estates system reflects... fundamental, normative judgments about
social life."',2
B.

CONTINGENT OR FIXED?

In
changes
in time,
resided

another usage, the bundle-of-rights term depicts historical
in the form of owned things. This usage posits that at some point
usually identified as the late-nineteenth century, value mostly
in land and other physical objects; at such a time, property

117. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 984
(2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules]; see also Smith, Property, supra note 13, at
1728 ("Property responds to uncertainty over uses by bundling uses together and delegating to the
owner the choice of how to use the asset, thus avoiding the need to specify uses at any stage.").
i18. Singer, supra note 12, at 1051.
i19. Id. at 1050; see also Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1566-67
(2003) (arguing that communication costs do not fully explain the numerus clausus principle; rather,
"limiting the number of property forms and standardizing their content facilitates the roles of property
in consolidating expectations and expressing ideal forms of relationship").
120. Singer, supra note 12, at io50. Progressive theorists are not indifferent to how property
functions. Yet they focus less on property's mechanics-its "nuts and bolts," so to speak-than on the
outcomes it produces. For further development of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 14662, 246-48.
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largely consisted of tangible items, so it made sense to think of property
as things (or rights to things). But over time, moving into the twentieth
century, property changed forms.' 2' Rather than owning farms (land and
plows and such), people owned firms -intangible interests in intangible
entities (corporations or partnerships).'2 2 Or they owned financial
instruments, which were not physical dollars, but rights or claims to
shares or profits.' As property "de-physicalized," it began to make sense
to think of property not as things (or not just as things), but as bundles of
rights functionally independent of the physical object (e.g., the stock
certificate, the note itself) that might denote those rights.'2 4 Thus, just as
it was in the social ordering view of bundles of rights, in this historical
account, property is again detached from ownership of or control over
"things" in the ordinary sense. This sets up another contest between the
information and progressive theories, implicating commitments about
the importance of stability over change and about institutional choice
considerations in property law.
According to the historical story, as each new intangible interest
became recognized as property, the precise constellation of legal
interests in the newly recognized intangible "thing" needed to be
defined. The change from tangible to intangible property forms led, it is
asserted, to a change in the conceptualization of property rights.
Property rights were, arguably, just whatever set of interests happened to
be legally recognized in any particular new form of property. Each new
intangible interest involved a new, and arguably distinct, bundle-of-rights
in owners and third parties. The bundle-of-rights metaphor here
emphasizes the contingency of any particular grouping of rights. As one

121. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION

OF AMERICAN LAW

1870-1960,

at 145-56

(1992).

122. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722,723 (1988).

123. John Langbein tells this story to explain changes in inheritance law. See id As Langbein
explains, "Into the eighteenth century, land was the dominant form of wealth." Id. During this period,
"wealth transmission from parents to children tended to center upon major items of patrimony such as
the family farm or the family firm." Id. But "technological forces" not only "broke up older familycentered modes of economic organization," they also "called forth two new forms of private-sector
wealth": financial assets ("stocks, bonds, bank deposits, mutual fund shares, insurance contracts, and
the like") and human capital. Id.
This change led to a "revolution" in family wealth transmission, a revolution driven by
important changes in the form in which property is held. "In today's economic order," Langbein
writes, it is "the new human capital rather than the old physical capital, that ... advantages a child"
and rescues him "from the harsh fate of being a mere laborer." Id. at 732-33. Relatedly, "most
parental wealth (apart from the parents' own human capital) now takes the form of financial assets,"
most particularly pension wealth, which, unlike the tangible assets of old, is consumed during the
parents' own lifetimes via annuitization. Id. at 743. Since human capital is transmitted inter vivos and
since most wealth remaining after the education of children is annuitized, there is now much less for
the probate system to do.
124. HORWVITz, supra note 121, at i56.
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scholar puts it, "the term 'property' did not imply any particular set of
rights over others. Rather, the particular combination of rights that
comprised property ina given case would be decided according to
circumstances."' 25
This "just-whatever" understanding of property-the idea that it is,
in effect, a bundle-of-rights that change over time as circumstances
warrantz61-arguably has significant implications for understanding the

relationship between property rights and the state. One set of potential
implications concerns the extent to which the state may subject property
to regulation. The argument here begins by observing that it was, after
all, the law that enabled the new sets of property rights to come into
being. Since state recognition/definition was essential to the creation of
new intangible property rights, then it followed that the state could
redefine/regulate - and alter - such new property forms."

That is, if property rights are the product of contingent judgments as
to what rights to recognize and what rights not to recognize at a given
moment in time -if what is in the bundle-of-rights is not fixed and can be
redefined-then it follows that it is open to the government to regulate
with a variety of goals in mind, including the aim of redistributing
wealth."' The idea that property is just a contingent bundle-of-rights thus
125.

Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325,

366 (1980). As developed below, this view is often associated with legal realism. However, it is by no
means confined to realists or their descendants. "Most modern economic accounts endow property
with no distinctive character at all. Property rights are simply 'entitlements,' little empty boxes filled
with a miscellany of use rights that operate in the background of a world consisting of nothing but in
personam obligations." Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 15. at 385.
126. Merrill and Smith and Eric Claeys refer to this idea as the "ad hoc bundle" conception. See
THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMrH, PROPERTY. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs, at v (2007); Eric R.

Claeys, Property ror: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 617, 623 (2oo9).

127. In its broadest form, the claim here emphasizes the extent to which "private" property
requires and depends on the state; without public protection, no one's property rights would be secure.
This idea is at the center of much of Joseph Singer's work. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 91. at 36, 68;
Joseph William Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for Granted:Minimum Standards for the
Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 139 (2oo8). This idea is
often traced back to the legal realists-and Robert Hale in particular-who developed it to defend
New Deal legislation against the charge that such legislation interfered with the operation of the free
market. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603, 626
(1943). The defense posited that there was nothing "free" about the market prior to regulation; basic

rules of property, even such seemingly innocuous rules as those forbidding the use of goods without
the owner's consent, invisibly "regulate" in favor of those who already happen to own goods. Different
background rules about who can withhold what from whom would lead to different outcomes, but
those different background rules would be no more "regulatory" than the rules that happened to be in
place previously. See id. The question thus is not whether the government can regulate, but in what
ways or to what ends it will regulate. For a description of how this argument was meant to work, and
why it has failed over time to gain the traction that might otherwise have been expected, see Baron,
Expressive Transparencyof Property, supra note 52, at 231-32.
128. See Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note x5, at 365 ("[T]he motivation
behind the realists' fascination with the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political. They sought
to undermine the notion that property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state
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appears to have clear political implications, justifying wholesale state
interventions in economic matters.' 2 9
The ideas that the rights contained in the property bundle are not
fixed, that the rights have changed over time, and that they may continue
to change, all are still quite vital in property theory.' These ideas are a
variation, in the regulatory realm, of the argument discussed in the
previous section, that property rights can be more or less infinitely
customized. In its political version, it is an important site of contest
between information and progressive theorists.
First of all, information theorists assert that the numerus clausus
principle-best characterized as "simply a fact about the way in which
the system of property rights operates""'3 '-demonstrates that at least the
common law rights of property have not in fact been contingent and
changeable over time, but rather have been remarkably stable.3' This
stability has resulted not because government lacks power to change
common law property rights, but because courts have chosen not to

intervention in regulating and redistributing property."); see also Smith, supra note 14, at 77 ("The
atomized bundle-of-rights picture of property makes the bundles the law provides look arbitrary and
makes re-engineering the bundle seem attractive.").
329.

See Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 15, at 365. One obvious

difficulty with this view is its potential to conflict with the view of property emphasizing fragmentation.
If, as earlier described, each separate "right" or "stick" in the property rights bundle is itself property
(and is its own "bundle of rights"), then any regulatory action that eliminates or even just reduces the
value of any individual right or stick arguably "takes" that fragmented property right. See HORWrTZ,
supra note 121, at 16o ("Th[e] process of abstracting the idea of property into market value
was ... dangerously over-inclusive [because] it made virtually every change in government policy that
caused a decline in market value potentially a taking-...."). During the nineteenth century, Horwitz
explains, "American courts came as close as they had ever had to saying that one had a property right
to an unchanging world." Id. at 151. Alexander argues that, in light of this problem, "[t]he whole
bundle-of-rights metaphor ought to be abandoned." Alexander, supra note 5, at 8o.
Yet the very fragmentation that creates the potential taking problem may, ironically, solve it.
Even if the government "takes" some rights or sticks, other fragments will inevitably remain, and if
"enough" remains, there is no taking after all. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative
Retrospective, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 439, 448 (2oo6).
Because [the bundle-of-rights approach] treats different property claims as disaggregated
rights, it expands the free action that legislators and regulators have to set policy. Once
property is disaggregated, regulators can sort through particular rights claims piecemeal.
Regulators may socialize a few owners' rights to satisfy the demands of legislative majorities
while still leaving the owners with a substantial residue. Regulators can insert or remove
different sticks in an owner's bag, but the owner still has "property'7 as long as she still has a
bag and other sticks.
Id.
130. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note i59, at 1532 ("The bundle of rights metaphor captures the truism

that property is an artifact, a human creation that can be, and has been, modified in accordance with
human needs and values."); Weinrib, supra note 88, at 120-22 (emphasizing that the concept of
property is "purposive" and that "it follows from the instrumental nature of property that the concept
should not be a static one").
531. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 24.
532.

Id. at 23.
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exercise such power. As Merrill and Smith characterize numerus clausus,
it operates as "a norm of judicial self-governance." 3 Yet numerus
clausus itself has a regulatory character; 4 if the government went about
redefining common law estates at will, the informational benefits of our
property system would be just as threatened as they would be if
individuals were permitted to customize property at will via contract. But
Merrill and Smith do not argue that numerus clausus limits government
power directly. Regulatory innovation is not barred under the numerus
clausus system. Rather, it is channeled to the legislature.'
For a variety of institutional reasons, however, legislative change is
unlikely to be dramatic. Just to take one example, the very expense of
procuring legislative changes "tightly rations the amount of reform."3 6
Still, as the emergence of the condominium estate proves, legislatures do
sometimes create new property forms.'37 Thus, legislative action can and
will lead to "some positive level of diversification in the recognized forms
of property." 8 But it will simply do so slowly and infrequently, under
conditions that "communicate information about the legal dimension of
property more effectively than judicially mandated changes.",I39
Here again, as with the rights-between-persons view of property as a
"bundle of rights," the information theorists' objection to the notion that
property rights are contingent is mainly directed toward the suggestion
that the state can alter the bundles at will and at any time. The kind of
radical contingency suggested by the "just-whatever" view of property
bundles is belied, the information theorists argue, by the actual stability
of property rights over time. And those theorists assert that the forces
that militate against radical change are salutary.
We see in this line of objection to the bundle-of-rights metaphor
some additional commitments of the information-focused theories. They
value stability over change and, as a matter of institutional choice,
strongly prefer legislative change to judicial action.
133. Id. atii.

134. Id. at 51 ("Throughout history and across numerous legal systems, the provision of standards
for the basic building blocks of the property system has been largely a government affair.").
135. Id at 58.

By limiting courts to enforcing the status quo in terms of recognized property interests, the
numerus clausus makes the courts an inhospitable forum for modifying existing forms of
property or creating new ones. Consequently, parties who wish to secure changes in the
pattern of available property rights must look elsewhere-most prominently, to the
legislature.
Id. Interestingly, Hale also argued that the legislature might be institutionally superior as a vehicle for
the redistributional changes he envisioned. See Hale, supra note 127, at 625.
136. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 63.
137. Id. at i6.
138. Id.at 40.
139. Id. at 69; see also id. at 6r-68 (describing legislative decisionmaking's advantages in terms of
"clarity, universality, comprehensiveness, stability, prospectivity, and implicit compensation").
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Progressive theorists challenge these commitments. Although they
accept the descriptive accuracy of the numerus clausus principle with
respect to common law estates in land, 4 o they share the realists' view that
property requires and is suffused with state regulation.' 4' They celebrate
reforms in areas as diverse as environmental'42 or landlord tenant"' law
that have involved state readjustments of owners' rights.'" Moreover, the
progressive theorists' explicit concern for the substantive ends property
achieves renders them far more receptive to change, in contrast to the
information theorists' preference for stability. 4 5 Finally, many of the
changes progressive theorists most herald are the product of court
decisions, suggesting far less interest in the institutional choice
commitments that are so strong for the information theorists.
C.

SIMPLE OR COMPLEX?

The estates system that progressive theorists posit is not our
ancestors' common law system of estates. Rather, it is one that has been
expanded to include the elaborate statutory and regulatory schemes that
govern contemporary property use.4 6 This is not our ancestors' common
law system of estates. The expanded estates system that the progressive
theorists seem to have in mind is, to state the obvious, a much "fatter"
bundle of rights, stuffed with interests and obligations. These are not
basic building blocks, like the estates of the numerus clausus, but rather
complex entities, serving and encompassing multiple values.'47 As we will
see, complexity is itself a value and, accordingly, a site of contest within
property theory.
Singer's bundling of rights is quite different from the bundling
advocated by information theorists such as Smith. Consider in this regard
Smith's description of how property operates:
Rather than being a list of use rights, property responds to uncertainty
over uses by bundling uses together, often without needing to specify
them at any stage. Property gives the right to exclude from a "thing,"
enforceable against everyone else ... and a crude delegation to the
owner avoids the costs of delineating use rights. On the dutyholder
14o. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 12, at 1023.
141. See SINGER, supra note 91, at 36 ("[P]roperty
supra note 127.

requires regulation."). On the realists' views, see

See Alexander, supra note 5, at 796-801.
143. See, e.g., Singer, supra note rz, at 1026.
144. Id. at 1055 (describing, among the normative features of property law in a free and
142.

democratic society, "widespread distribution of property and realistic potential for access to
ownership").
145. Id. ("[W]e value both stability and change.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
147. Singer, supra note 12, at io~o-55 (describing the "plural values" underlying democratic
property rights, including, inter alia, freedom, stability, family, autonomy, mobility, and "widespread
distribution of property").
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side, the message is a simple one-to "keep out"-and this
simultaneously protects a reservoir of uses for the owner without
officials or dutyholders needing to know what those might be.">
The bundling accomplished by the "exclusion strategy" works by its very
simplicity: "very rough signals or informational variables-such as
presence inside or outside the boundary line around a parcel of landare employed to protect an indefinite class of uses with minimal
precision."' 49 As is true for communication generally, the more extensive
and diverse the audience for a particular message about property rights,
the more "stripped-down" and formal the message must be. 5 o
The fine-grained, nuanced notions of property elaborated by the
progressive theorists hardly fit this model. There is no way that
"flourishing," "virtue," "freedom," or "democracy" can be "stripped
down" or formalized. Indeed, formalization is the last thing the
proponents of flourishing or democracy seek. What recommends virtue
theory, for example, is its capacity to make us "appreciate and assign the
proper weight to the many subtle and incommensurable values
(including economic values) implicated by" the decisions of landowners
and government.'
So also, "[t]he democratic model of property
recognizes that property serves plural values and that the law should
reflect those multiple values."' 52 Thus, in resolving a hypothetical dispute
between a tenant who wishes to post a political sign and a landlord who
wishes to stop her, a decisionmaker would be required "to make
substantive choices" about all of the following:
the interests at stake, the values those interests implicate, the relative
strength, relevance, and cogency of those values in particular social
settings, the social relationships that will result from the choice of legal
rule, the opportunities that will be enabled or cut off, and the relation
between property rights and political and social life.' 53
The premium here is not on clear answers that would provide clear
guidance to landlords and tenants in the future, but rather on asking "the

Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 117, at 978.
149. Id. at 978-79.
i5o. Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, io THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 5. 15
(2009); see also Smith, Language of Property, supra note 15, at I113, 1135.
151. Pefialver, supra note 12, at 868.

148.

152. Singer, supra note 12, at 1054.

153. Id. at io58; see also Pefialver, supra note 12. at 882 ([A]n obligation to share one's property
in kind with others might arise, for example, (i) because exclusion . . . is inconsistent with the dignity
of the excluded person; (2) because of the unusually acute . .. need for access .. .; (3) because of the
relationships the recipients have formed with the owner's land; or (4) because of the relationships of
dependence or reliance that owners have formed with the recipients.").
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right questions."5 I 4 The contrast between the clear and simple signals
sought by the information theorists could not be much starker.
Applications of Alexander's social obligation norm raise similar
problems. Under the social obligation norm, Alexander asserts,
the owner [of property] is morally obligated to provide the society of
which the individual is a member those benefits that the society
reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing. These are
benefits necessary to the members' development of those human
qualities essential to their capacity to flourish as moral agents and that
have some reasonable relationship with ownership of the affected
land."'
One example of this social obligation norm in operation is the right
of access to beaches that some courts recognize under the public trust
doctrine." 6 Alexander concedes that "by diluting the right to exclude
with respect to one type of publicly valuable resource, these decisions
create uncertainty for present and future owners of other resources."' 57
Nonetheless, he argues that the cases are explained as attempts by courts
to define the contours of private ownership of an increasingly valuable
interest in land in a way that promotes human flourishing under
"conditions of increasing congestion and social interdependency."' 5
Notice that the beach access cases convert exclusion rules into
governance rules, and this is true of the other "use sacrifices" (historic
preservation and environmental regulations) that Alexander cites as
illustrative of the social obligation norm.'59 In each instance, the
argument is not that the owner must, or must always, sacrifice his or her
freedom to do as he or she wishes on the land. Rather, the argument is
that she might; it depends on whether, in the particular circumstances,
the sacrifice is required. In the beach access cases, for example, "[i]f
members of the public.. . have reasonable means of gaining access to a
public beach, ... the owner's right to exclude is preserved."
This is, of course, exactly the sort of uncertainty that information
theorists find problematic. As Merrill and Smith write, "If the rules for
determining access to and use of resources required the gathering of

154. Singer, supra note 12, at ro6r; see also Pefialver, supra note 12, at 876 ("Virtue theory's lack
of an algorithm for social decision making, far from being a fatal weakness, is actually a point of
strength ... [because] it focuses decision makers' attention exactly where it should be.").
155. Alexander, supra note 5, at 774.
156. See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.zd 112 (N.J. 2005);

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
157. Alexander, supra note 5, at 804.

158. Id. at 807; see also id. at 8o6 ("I do suggest ... that recreation is an important aspect of health,
which is itself a vital dimension of the capability of life, and that providing all persons, including poor
people, with reasonable access to basic modes of recreation and relaxation would materially contribute
to the goal of being capable of living lives worth living.").
159. Id. at 791-801.
s6o. Id. at 807-
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detailed information.. . this would not produce the stability of
expectation needed for widespread coordifiation."' 6i Yet detailed
information is exactly what is required under both the democratic and
the social obligation models of property. Of course, information theorists
do not argue that governance rules, with their attendant higher
information costs, are bad per se; to the contrary, they assert that when
the interests at stake are sufficiently important, such rules are totally
appropriate. ' But the progressive theorists' approach treats all disputes

as at least presumptively high stakes, for even commonplace exercises of
commonplace property rights can implicate important values. Thus, for
progressive theorists, all property cases are plausibly governance, rather
than exclusion, cases. Or, putting this point another way, in the eyes of
information theorists, we can never unreflectively apply even simple
property rules, but must always ask whether the application of the rule in
the particular circumstances presented actually furthers the values for
which the rule purportedly stands.
Again, it is worth getting hold of precisely what is contested in these
two visions. It is tempting to characterize the argument that property is
fundamentally about information as merely an argument about form -an
argument for crystalline rules as opposed to muddy standards.' But that
would not be entirely accurate. As we have just seen, information
theorists concede that formal, easily processed exclusion rules are
appropriately supplemented by more complex governance schemes in
certain situations." Moreover, the values sought to be advanced by
progressive theorists can in some instances be expressed in the form of
rules, 6 5 or at least "rule-like norms." 66
It is also tempting to characterize the information theorists' position
as one about the form of property rules and to characterize the
progressive theorists' position as one about the substance of such rules. 6 ,

161. Merrill & Smith, Morality of Property, supra note 13, at 1857.
162. Id. at 1859; see Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note I17, at o24-25 (arguing that

where to draw the line between exclusion and governance is an "empirical question").
163. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 58o (1988). But
see Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 803 ("Because in rem rights are binding on an indefinite class of
persons, the rules must communicate information about the scope of protected rights to this large
universe of interests at acceptable costs. This means that substantive legal norms associated with in
rem rights are more likely to be expressed as rules that turn on one or a small number of publicly
observable states of fact, and thus are formalistic or bright line in character.").
164. See, e.g., Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 117, at 989 ("[A]s the pressure on

and value of resources rise, we often find a shift from exclusion to governance."); Smith, supra note 14.
at 79 (where "[m]ore precision in terms of who can do what" can be determined in a way that is costeffective, a governance strategy may be appropriate).
r65. Dagan, supra note i 19, at 1562; see also Dagan, supra note 2. at 8-q.
s66. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1064.
167. See Duncan Kennedy, Forrn and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1685 (1976).
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In recent work, Henry Smith has disputed this characterization, arguing
that what divides progressive theorists such as Alexander from
information theorists like himself is not that they are in pursuit of
different ends, but that they focus on different means to the achievement
of those ends.' Alexander and his fellow progressive theorists, Smith
asserts, would make "direct reference" to the end of human flourishing
in each and every individual case. 6 9But, Smith argues, it may be better to
address ends "only indirectly," for "[c]onstant reference to these [end]
interests would undermine property's advantages of solving problems
wholesale and coordinating the activities of often-anonymous actors." 7 0
The in rem exclusion rights at the core of property are a way of
promoting human flourishing at low cost. Without "answering to
outsiders," an owner can use the property for any number of purposes"the owner of land can live there, read a book, park his car, and grow
crops, etc." 7' These interests, Smith argues, "are why we want to have
property-and they do promote human flourishing."' 7 2
The debate, then, concerns how property operates. Is it-and should
it be-through "use by use, conflict by conflict" evaluation, or,
alternatively, through decisions made "up front and across the board"? 73
Information theorists argue that simple ex ante "baseline" in rem
exclusion rights enable property to carry out its function to coordinate
the behavior of "large numbers of anonymous and far-flung people." 74
And those rights, the argument continues, do so more effectively than
the put-all-the-values-on-the-table approach favored by progressive
theorists.
We now come to a fundamental issue. Recall that information
theorists are committed to a functional view of property. Property
produces coordination, and coordination is a value, a social goal worth
worrying about. It is not obvious that it is any more-or any lessimportant than fostering flourishing, virtue, freedom, or democracy. But,

168. Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American PropertyLaw, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 963-71 (2009).

169. Id. at 964; see also id. at 965 ("Alexander and others ... would like to see the end of
flourishing more in direct view."); Alexander, supra note 5, at 774 (calling for "open acknowledgment"
of the social-obligation norm and "explicit development of its parameters").
170. Smith, supra note 168, at 963.
171. Id. at 964.
172. Id. And in individual cases where they do not, the governance strategy is always available:

"Where problems are important enough and cannot be solved better in a different way, we start to use
more tailored solutions-governance -that make more direct reference to the ends that we
collectively want to see served." Id. at 964-65.
173. Id. at 963. Smith admits that "talking about ultimate ends is more glamorous than asking the
more engineering-like question of how to serve them," but argues that legal scholars excel at
"institutional design," and should "embrace our role." Id. at 970.
174. Id. at 971; see also id. at 970 (citing "coordination in a complex world" as one of several
"emergent properties of the entire property system").
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at least as the coordination goal is elaborated by information theorists,
coordination requires relatively simple signals. And that requirement
may be inconsistent with the demands of the progressive approaches to
take account of a wide array of values in each and every decision about
property."' Information theorists concede as much, acknowledging that
accomplishing coordination goals may require inattention to particulars
that might otherwise seem salient, including, for example, "information
about the attributes of rival claimants that might otherwise have moral
relevance."p6
What is at stake, then, might be seen as not just the optimal level of
standardization-or, as frequently asserted, of exclusion177-in property,
but also the optimal level of systemic complexity.'" The information
theorists' claim is not just descriptive, but normative-to coordinate
social behavior effectively, property should be (on the whole) simple. It
is hard to provide simple signals and the coordination associated with
them if you are in endless conversation. But conversation is exactly what
progressive theorists want. Their claims, like those of the information
theorists, are also both descriptive and normative-to promote
flourishing, freedom, virtue, and democracy, property should be (on the
whole) attentive to a wide array of factors and should not employ
simplifying rules that are insufficiently attentive to the values at stake.
This is not an argument about the simplicity or complexity of
particular property rules. Sometimes simple rules, such as those against
trespassing, can protect a wide range of values.'79 Likewise, sometimes
complex rules, such as those protecting fair use in copyright, will have

175. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 12, at 1059 ("In defining rights and obligations with respect to

property, we are obligated to consider the full range of human values we care about rather than
merely thinking quantitatively about how to maximize preferences.").
176. Merrill & Smith, The Morality of Property, supra note 13, at 1857.
177. See sources cited supra note 2; supra text accompanying notes 16-27.

178. Nestor Davidson has argued that this issue of complexity does not require a resolution at all.
See Nestor M. Davidson, Standardizationand Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1597, 1644

(2oo8). He asserts that property is fundamentally "pluralist" in nature, and that its standard forms
"engraft a variety of (at times clashing) public regulatory goals onto the basic law of private
property. . . . It is the variety and sheer messiness of the mandatory content of the forms that make the
numerus clausus so interesting." Id. The picture of property as an enormous tent, employing a stable
"basic regulatory framework of forms" to encompass or express numerous conflicting values, id. at
1636, has enormous appeal. Yet somehow it fails to address the obvious points of disagreement within
contemporary property theory.
179. Thus Alexander praises the court's holding for the landowner and against the trespasser in
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997), as consistent with human flourishing.

Jacque is usually cited as the quintessential right-to-exclude case. In Jacque, the court upheld
an award of punitive damages for what was arguably a harmless, yet clearly intentional, trespass. See
id. at 621-22. Alexander avoids the traditional reading of Jacque by emphasizing that the trespass
involved the plaintiffs' home and thus their capacity for sociality. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 815-17.
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distributional consequences that are not progressive.' The argument is
less about the rules themselves than about how much we need to discuss
them and their application. In the eyes of information theorists, property
rules instantiate and encode values. Trespass is a model here.' 8' The right
to exclude is the way we protect autonomy, flourishing, and so forth, and
what makes property work so well-the way in which it uniquely and
exceptionally functions-is that exclusion rules eliminate the need to
discuss autonomy, flourishing, and the like in each individual case. But
for progressive theorists we can never simply trust the rules to express
values. Maybe straightforward application of trespass rules will promote
human flourishing in a given case, but maybe it will not." In every case,
we must ask. Constant questioning makes life-and property-pretty
complicated.
In this sense, not just simplicity (or exclusion), but complexity itself
is a contested feature of our system of property.'' That is to say, isolating
complexity itself as an important variable might help us understand what
is contested between the information and progressive theories. Clearly,
the conflict is in part a substantive conflict among the values of
coordination, virtue, democracy, and so forth. This conflict is probably
intractable in some circumstances. But it is important to see that the
conflict is also in part about complexity. Progressive theorists
affirmatively value ongoing consideration of whether, in each and every
case, property rules are serving the proper values and creating
appropriate relationships. Such consideration renders even the most
apparently simple case potentially complex. Deriving as it does from
conversations about the quality of our social life, complexity is itself a
value, and it is one that is importantly, but not obviously, contested.
Perhaps the optimal level of complexity"' will also be a matter of

18o. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV.

1535

(2005).

181. Notwithstanding Alexander's use of Jacque in The Social-Obligation Norm, see supra note

179, progressive theorists are, in general, far less likely to look to trespass cases as paradigmatic of
property law, invoking instead the range of statutory and administrative regulations that limit
common-law exclusion rights. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75, 146-47.
182. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 374-75 (N.J. 1971), is the quintessential example. In this famous
casebook case, the court declined to characterize as a trespass an unconsented-to entry by government
workers seeking to offer services to migrant workers housed on a farmer's land. Id. The court found
illegitimate the farmer's attempt to use his power to exclude in a way that affected the dignity and
destiny of the workers on his property. Id.
183. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 4, at io66 ("[T]he core of property is complex, certainly more
complex than [exclusion alone] . . . ."). But see Smith, supra note 168, at 968 ("It is because the world
of interactions is so complex that modular[, exclusion-based] solutions must be on the table.").
184. Like standardization, complexity "comes in degrees." See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 38.
Extreme and minimal complexity, like extreme and minimal standardization, have costs and benefits.
But until we discuss complexity as an independent value, how would these costs and benefits be
assessed?
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intractable dispute.'15 But until it is openly discussed, there is no way to
know.
In summary, for information theorists, the beauty of the property
system is that it shortcuts discussions. Simple signals tell owners that they
are free to choose how to use their property and tell nonowners to keep
out. No judgments need be made, no questions need be asked, about the
merit of owners' chosen uses. For progressive theorists, the beauty of the
property system is that, potentially if not actually, it facilitates
discussions. Any use conflict provides an opportunity to consider and
reconsider whether the system is providing proper attention to the
proper values. Discussion is complicated-it takes time and resources. It
can be enriching, teaching us what we value and why. For progressive
theorists, that very complexity is to be affirmed and embraced. For the
information theorists, complexity keeps the system from working
properly. Complexity is thus itself a site of contest within property
theory.

Recent interest in and critiques of the bundle-of-rights metaphor
provide a window on the contested commitments of information and
progressive theorists. These commitments relate to property's
exceptionalism, to whether it should be regarded functionally or in terms
of the ends or outcomes it produces, to the importance of stability as
opposed to change, and to the institution through which change should
come, if change is needed at all.
A second set of contested commitments involves complexity. The
numerus clausus dovetails nicely with a theory of property as
information. As that theory explains, property works as a distinctive
system by providing clear signals to all the world about how to behave
with respect to property owned by others. In order to be clear, property's
signals must be simple. But the fact of the matter is that the kind of
"property" envisioned by the progressive theories would be substantially
more complicated than the simple bundles lauded by the information
theorists. Moreover, in the eyes of progressive theorists, human
flourishing, virtue, and the like all require constant questioning of
whether property rules actually serve the values for which they were
adopted, and that questioning complicates property law in a way
185. For a taste of this dispute, see Smith, supra note 168, at 969.
Property law provides the overall structure to manage the complexity that Alexander rightly
emphasizes, but the need to manage complexity points to the need, at least in theory. for a
modular solution. If so, his considerations lead in practice exactly away from his skepticism
toward delegation to owners.
Id.
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incompatible with the functional commitments of the informational
model.

III.

DUTIES, REDISTRIBUTION, AND

TIME WITHIN PROPERTY THEORY

As Hohfeld teaches, property rights (and privileges, powers, and
immunities) come paired with reciprocal "correlatives" (duties, no-rights,
liabilities, and disabilities).' 8 6 In general, property scholarship has tended
to focus on the positive side of these pairings, on the way in which
property prevents waste, encourages trade, facilitates self-development,
and so on.'8 7 But in both theory and in reality, duties and no-rights (etc.)
matter; it is in terms of these negative sides of property rights that
nonowners experience our property system.'"8 In this Part, I explore the
way in which duties return us to the contested commitments of
information and progressive theories of property.
Section A explores the ways in which the two strands of property
theory explicitly deal with the question of duties. 8 9 For the information
theorists, duties are highly salient. Indeed, one of property's main
functions is to inform dutyholders of their principal obligation, the
obligation to "keep off."' 0 The progressive theorists also clearly care
about duties. Under their theories, the question of whether one has a
property right would be resolved in part based on the duties such a right
would entail. These very different-and probably incompatibleapproaches to the question of the role of duties in property law reflect
the divisions seen earlier between the information theorists' focus on
function and the progressive theorists' focus on ends.
Rights and duties are relational, and section B focuses on the two
strands' approach to the relationships that property produces. The
information theorists' commitment to functionalism renders them
relatively indifferent to the quality of relationships between owners, or
between owners and nonowners. As long as everyone is directed to
where they need to be-in or out, on or off, things owned by othersproperty is doing its job. In contrast, the progressive theorists'
commitment to ends requires concern over the substantive character of
the social relations property produces. This concern leads progressive
theorists directly to questions of distributional fairness.

186. Hohfeld, supra note 88, at 30. Hohfeld also organized the interests listed above into
"opposites": rights/no-rights, privileges/duties, powers/disabilities, and immunities/liabilities. Id.
187. See Baron, Property and "No Property", supra note 52, at 1445.

188. Id.
189. For convenience, unless the context requires more precision, I will use the term "duties" to
include all the "negative" aspects of property interests, including no-rights, disabilities, and liabilities.
190. Of course, the system also operates to delineate rights in such a way that buyers will know
exactly what they are obtaining when they acquire property. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 26-34.
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Section C addresses issues connected to the pace and place of
change. If, as the progressive theorists assert, redistribution is required in
order to further human flourishing, freedom, or democracy, then
relatively quick action is needed, and it is not terribly important whether
such action comes from courts or legislatures. If, in contrast, the focus is
on function, as it is for information theorists, there will be a strong
preference for any proposed alteration in the existing property order to
be channeled to the legislature, which is inclined to "ration" change, and
produce it more slowly.
A.

DUTIES IN INFORMATION AND PROGRESSIVE THEORIES

For information theorists, duties are an explicit part of the property
equation. As we have seen, information theorists argue that property
rights must be rights in rem precisely in order to tell dutyholders what to
do (or not to do).' 9' "Property gives the right to exclude from a 'thing,'
good against everyone else.9 2 On the dutyholder side, the message is a
simple one-to 'keep out."'
From the property owner's point of view, the system, working
largely via rules of exclusion, delegates to an owner decisions about use
(or nonuse) of land; that owner need not answer to others in choosing
what to do with his or her property.' 93 In this respect, the information
theorists' claims for property fit comfortably within the tradition that
extols property for its enhancement of owners' freedom or autonomy:
Many, especially those with a libertarian orientation, have argued that
property affords a sphere of liberty protected from intrusion by others,
including the government. Property rules reinforce this sphere of
liberty because.. . they do not require an inquiry by courts into the
uses that owners have in mind for their assets.' 94
As we have seen, this delegation and the sphere of freedom it affords
owners are, in the eyes of information theories, important parts of the
way that property promotes human flourishing.
But the information theorists do not focus solely on the advantages
of an in rem system for owners. As information theorists see it, an in rem
system has advantages for nonowners as well. The latter must respecti.e., not violate-owners' rights. To avoid liability, they must know what
191. See supra Part I.A.
192. Smith, Property, supra note 13, at 1728.
193. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 117, at 1o23, see also Merrill & Smith, supra

note 21, at 791 ("Exclusion identifies a person or entity as the manager of a resource (the owner), and
then delegates to this manager the discretion to select from among an open-ended set of potential
uses."); Smith, Property, supra note 13, at 1728 ("[T]he right to exclude . . . protects a reservoir of uses

to the owner without officials needing to know what those might be."). On delegation, see supra text
accompanying note I17194. Smith, Property, supra note 13, at1772 (footnote omitted).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49, 17o-72.
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their duties are. Rights in rem, implemented via exclusion, obviate the
need for dutyholders to acquire and process large amounts of
information."96Dutyholders in this system need not know anything about
the owner or the range of uses to which the owner intends to devote his
or her property." Nor need dutyholders know anything about an
owner's rights. They need only know that they are not themselves owners
in order to understand their key obligation-to keep off.
Notice how in the information-based theory of property, the
negative, or duties, side of the rights/duties pairing is offered as an
affirmative justification for the property regime:
In rem rights offer standardized packages of negative duties of
abstention that apply automatically to all persons in the society when
they encounter resources that are marked in the conventional manner
as being "owned." Information is conserved by making these duties
apply automatically to delineated resources without regard to the
identity of the owner; by making the duties uniform; by restricting the
duties to a short list of negative obligations, easily defined and
understood by all; and by marking boundaries using easily observed

proxies.'
There is a certain irony in using the disabilities of nonowners-their
potential vulnerability to owners, whose rights they might otherwise

unwittingly violate-to justify a system that grants large numbers of
powers to owners.'" Nonetheless, in the information-based theories of
property, the duties side of property rights is central.
The information theorists' approach to duties reflects their
commitment to function in property law. For them, property coordinates
behavior. Specifically, it speaks to who is allowed to be where.
Nonowners are not permitted on privately owned property without the
owner's permission; they have a duty to keep off. Property's background
rules of exclusion helpfully tell them where they are not allowed to be. If,
as is the case for information theory, the concern is primarily with
coordination in this simple sense, none of this is problematic. To the
contrary, it is all to the good, as everyone is directed to his or her proper
place.
Progressive theories of property tend to be much less explicit about
duties than the informational theories. On one hand, there is very little
discussion of dutyholders as a group, or of dutyholding per se. On the
other hand, it is integral to the progressive theorists' arguments that
right-holders have fewer rights than conventional, consolidation-based
notions of ownership suggest.2" They alsos have duties to other owners
196. Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property,supra note v5, at 387.
'97. Smith, supra note 14, at 78.
198. Merrill & Smith, supra note 21, at 794.
199. See Baron, Property and "No Property",supra note 52, at 1445200. On consolidation, see supra text accompanying notes 114-17-
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and to nonowners and thus they are in a meaningful sense also
dutyholders -they have obligations?0 '
All of the progressive theories locate property in the realm of
community, and focus on the way the exercise of rights by an owner can
and does affect others within the relevant community. Thus, Singer
writes that "[e]very legal right should be understood not merely by
reference to the powers and rights it gives the owner but by reference to
the impacts of the exercise of those powers on others and the shape and
character of the social relationships engendered by those rights and
powers."202 "Because property law concerns relations among people,
property owners have obligations as well as rights."" Specifically, as we
have seen, "we have an obligation of attentiveness. We are not free to
ignore the effects of our actions on others . . . ."zo4
Obligation is also prominent in Pefialver's virtue theory:
Our ability to flourish requires the presence of a material and
communal infrastructure that itself depends upon the contributions of
each of us. We cannot value our ability to flourish without at the same
time affirming an obligation to cooperate with others in order to
sustain the shared infrastructure on which that ability depends."
As in the case of Singer's democratic theory, the obligation to take
others' interests into account may involve obligations that are
redistributive: "Because the system of private property as a whole is
established in order to facilitate the ability of members of the community
to flourish, owners' rights are qualified by an obligation to share from
their surplus property with those who need them in order to satisfy more
fundamental needs."9206
Finally, Alexander's social obligation norm is, well, obligational.
Alexander writes that "property owners owe far more responsibilities to
others, both owners and non-owners, than the conventional imagery of
property rights suggests. Property rights are inherently relational;
because of this characteristic, owners necessarily owe obligations to

201. Putting this point another way, progressive theorists flip the question "what duties do
nonowners owe to owners?" to the question "what duties do owners owe to nonowners?"
202. Singer, supra note 12, at 3o47; see also Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 12, at 1o94-98

(describing our "interdependence," and urging emphasis not on "the abstract categories of the law,"
but rather on "the concrete social world in which each person is the owner of certain resources and not
of others.").
203. Singer, supra note 12, at 1048.
204. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also SINGER, supra note 91, at 18 ("Owners have
obligations; they have always had obligations. We can argue about what those obligations should be,
but no one can seriously argue that they should not exist.").
205. Pefialver, supra note 12. at 870 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 880; see also id. at 877 ("[AJ proper concern for human flourishing includes an effort to
ensure that the fruits of the land's productivity .. ,. are distributed in a manner consistent with that
ultimate goal .... ").
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others."' As in the beach access cases discussed earlier, the obligations
of ownership may require redistributional sacrifices in the interests of
those who need access to, or use of, an owners property.zo8
Just as the information theorists' approach to duties reflects their
commitment to function, the progressive theorists' approach to duties
reflects their commitment to evaluate property principally in terms of
ends. How property coordinates people is less important to the
progressive theorists than what relationships property constructs. If those
relationships are dramatically unequal-in terms of power, reciprocity,
or resources-then they must be reconfigured. As part of that
reconfiguration, owners may have to sacrifice. Thus, they may owe
previously unrecognized duties to nonowners or to other owners.
In the end, both information and progressive theorists care about
property's impact on dutyholders, but in entirely different ways. The
information theorists focus on the way that property makes dutyholders
better off as dutyholders, by more cheaply and accurately signaling what
they can (and mostly cannot) do. The progressive theorists, by contrast,
focus on the way that property does or could make rightholders into
dutyholders, which makes dutyholders better off in a different way, as
the beneficiaries of substantive obligations owed to them by owners. For
the information theorists, rights define duties. If there is a property right,
then it is a right in rem, and it is characterized by nonowners' duties to
keep off. For progressive theorists, in contrast, property rights never just
are; whether a particular property right arises or governs at all-the
scope of every property right-will, or should, always depend on the
duties to which that right might give rise.

B.

REDISTRIBUTION IN INFORMATION AND PROGRESSIVE THEORIES

When it comes to explicit consideration of redistribution, things are
reversed. Redistribution is a prominent theme in progressive theories of
property, and is nearly invisible in information theories. Again, the
difference derives from the contested commitments to function and ends.
It also derives from differing views about property's exceptionalism.
In both visions, property operates to organize social relations. For
information theorists, property does so in ordinary cases by consolidating
the use rights over a particular thing in an owner. Neither the state nor
other citizens need to be concerned with owners' identities (who they
are, what they are like, whether they have means in addition to the
particular property item in question) or behavior (they can live there or
elsewhere, read a book, open a factory or grow crops, park a car or build

207. Alexander, supra note 5, at 747-48.

208. See supra text accompanying notes x56-58-
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a boat). Owners will know that they largely control the owned thing,
while nonowners of that thing will know not to interfere with it.
There is not much texture in this account of the social world;
individuals here are not depicted as interacting much, because for
functional purposes nothing turns on interactions between them." Of
course, in actuality, many social interactions may occur between owners
of different properties, or between owners of properties and nonowners,
and these may be rewarding or disappointing or functional or
entertaining. But for the information theorists, it is not important to
focus on these social interactions directly. Indeed, it may be better not to
do so: "Constant reference to ... interests would undermine property's
advantages of solving problems wholesale and coordinating the activities
of often-anonymous actors., 2 0 Instead, the focus should be on the
mechanism by which, using very simple signals, much of the social world
is organized functionally at very low cost.
Conversely, the quality of social life is very much at the center of the
progressive theories. Precisely because property is a social institution, we
must, they argue, attend to the character of the relationships it enables.
For example, we must be concerned with "the terms on which people are
able to recruit each other for social cooperation."' Moreover, we should
understand property rights not only in terms of owners' powers and
rights, but also in terms of "the shape and character of the social
relationships engendered by those rights and powers.' 2 2 This evaluation
requires "qualitative" judgment, i.e., judgments about the "qualitative
character" of the relationships that property structures.213
Part of the quality being evaluated in the progressive theorists'
model is distributional fairness. Thus, Singer argues that among the
multiple, plural values that democratic property law must reflect is the
"widespread distribution of property and realistic potential for access to

With respect, for example, to a car:
In order to maintain a semblance of stability in [the property] system, not only must each
owner recognize and exercise dominion over his own car, but virtually all members of
society-owners and nonowners alike-must recognize and respect the unique claims of
owners to their own particular auto. In other words, virtually everyone must recognize and
consider themselves bound by general duties not to interfere with autos that they know are
owned by some anonymous other.
Merrill & Smith, Morality of Property, supra note 13, at 1853-54. Lior Strahilevitz has characterized
the basic exclusionary right at the core of the system in the information view as a "hermit's right." See
209.

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Right to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1835,
1841 (2006).
210. Smith, supra note 168, at 963.
211. Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 1 2, at 1243.
212. Singer, supra note 12, at1o47213. Id. at lo47-48; see also Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 12, at 1243

("Property rights ..,. deeply and necessarily structure interpersonal relations.").
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ownership." 14 Alexander and Pefialver both argue that human
flourishing may require redistribution. Since, as Alexander puts it, "every
person is equally entitled to flourish[,]

. ..

every person must be equally

entitled to those things essential for human flourishing," including "the
material resources required to nurture" foundational capabilities.' Or,
as Pefialver asserts, "redistribution of land rights via in-kind transfers of
ownership or occupancy will, at times, be the only appropriate way of
fostering human flourishing."6
Except in the context of institutional choice questions,' information
theorists tend not to talk much about redistribution. Again, this is a
product of their focus on function rather than ends; if property's essence
is to provide large amounts of cooperation at low cost, then the concern
is primarily with the mechanism rather than with the outcome. Indeed, in
responding to Alexander's social-obligation model, Smith suggests that
the informational values of property's organizing system require
deferring redistribution questions to other areas of law. "Perhaps," he
states, "law itself has a modular structure and manages complexity by
allowing some areas to specialize in some problems without constant
reference to what is going on elsewhere.""1
We see here again the informational emphasis on property's
functional exceptionalism. It is not like other areas of law; it solves
different problems. If it is to continue to do its work organizing social
relations at low cost, there is a limit to the issues we can ask it to address.
This is not so for progressive theorists, who put a premium on the quality
of relationships property produces.
Redistribution is no more inherently inconsistent with the
information theorists' vision than is a thick view of human interaction.
But for them the question is whether the property system is the right
place for it. Not only does that lead them to be more agnostic about
whether redistribution might better be carried out through tax and
transfer systems rather than by judicial alteration of rights,' it also alters
their gaze, forcing attention toward the possibility that the kind of caseby-case assessments that lead progressives to seek redistribution in
individual cases might undermine the "wholesale" techniques that are
part of property's exceptional mechanism for solving social problems.
214. Singer, supra note 12, at 1o55.
215. Alexander, supra note 5, at 768.
216. Pefialver, supra note 12, at 882.
217. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 66-68.
218. Smith, supra note 168, at 973.

219. Smith is somewhat ambiguous on this point. At one point he asks why "pleasing old buildings
and public beaches" should be provided "at personal expense, rather than the government funding
them by taxing other comparably wealthy citizens." Id. at 96'. But at another point in the same piece
he disclaims having an opinion on whether the redistribution sought by progressive theorists such as
Alexander would better be achieved through a tax and transfer system. See id. at 973.
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Here again, we see contested commitments over function and ends, and
over property's exceptionalism as a legal category.
C. CHANGE IN INFORMATION AND PROGRESSIVE THEORIES
Redistribution would change our property order. How quickly
should change occur? The pace of change-the issue of time in property
law-is not often explicitly contested between the two theoretical
strands. But the tone of the information and progressive theorists is, in
this regard, notably different, suggesting divergent views about the
urgency of the need for change.
Let us return to the information theorists' discovery of the numerus
clausus principle. The numerus clausus, they argue, is "simply a fact
about the way in which the system of property rights operates."2 " Indeed,
it has been a fact so long that its very existence has "penetrated the
consciousness of common-law lawyers only weakly."22 ' Although it might
appear to be freedom-limiting insofar as it does not allow parties to
customize property interests in idiosyncratic, individually chosen ways, it
does not generally frustrate parties' intentions because their objectives
"can be realized by a more complex combination of the standardized
building blocks of property."2 2 2 The numerus clausus "imposes a brake on
efforts by parties to proliferate new forms of property rights," but it also
"permits some positive level of diversification in the recognized forms of
property." 3 Finally, under the numerus clausus principle, change is
channeled to the legislature. 2 4 Legislative change is expensive, and so
"the very expense of securing such changes tightly rations the amount of
reform. Fewer reforms translate into greater stability in the dimensions
of property rights." 5 But, where needed, change has occurred: "where a
significant demand for a new form of property has emerged, as with the
condominium and the time-share, legislation establishing these forms has
often spread very rapidly. 226
There is a story here. Our property system, the story goes, has
existed for a very long time, so long that we have not really noticed it.
While it may seem restricting, it advances freedom. The limited forms the
system permits can be combined in a wide variety of ways to achieve
almost any desired end. The system has not changed much, and it does
22

22

Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 24.
Id.
222. Id. at 35.
223. Id. at 40.
224. Id. at 58. On the information theorists' institutional choice preference for legislative change,
see supra text accompanying notes 135-39.
225. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 63.
226. Id. at 66-67. Legislative inertia, they go on to argue. "may be more the product of a lack of
consensus about the proper path of reform than of any inherent inability of legislatures to respond to
demands for changes in property systems." Id. at 67.
220.
221.
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not need to change much. This is why legislative reforms are superior to
judicial reforms: when we need them, as with condos and time-shares, we
will get them, but otherwise change will largely be rationed, ensuring that
the system will be largely stable.
As we have seen, while the progressive theorists accept the
descriptive accuracy of the numerus clausus principle, it does not hold
the same implications for them. They emphasize the way that property is
a "dynamic institution, a set of rules evolving in response to
technological and social innovation."' The question for them is whether,
right now, property is promoting human flourishing, virtue, freedom, or
democracy. Where it is not, it should change, even if change requires
owners to "sacrifice their property interests in some way" in order to
enable others "to live well-lived lives and to promote just social
relations."22' And property law has changed. The basic menu of common

law estates has been extensively supplemented by statutes and
regulations that adjust and readjust the benefits and burdens of social
life, as well as by judge-made doctrines, such as the implied warranty of
habitability, that dramatically change the balance of power between
owners and nonowners.
There is a story here, too, though it is somewhat less well developed.
In this story, property has changed over time, and it will (and should)
continue to change. It has always limited owners' freedom to protect the
interests of others, and there is nothing wrong with that, for human
flourishing, virtue, freedom, and the like require sacrifice. Legislative
change is good, but so are judicial changes. The only important question
is whether we have the right quality of social relations, and if we do not,
then property rights must be adjusted.
These stories highlight the information and progressive theorists'
differences over the relative importance of institutional choice in
property law.' But they also highlight a different attitude toward time.
The information theorists wish primarily to decelerate the pace of
change; in their eyes, property has worked well over time, continues to
work well, and changes when it needs to. But for the progressive
theorists, property must be dynamic. Quality of relationships matters,

227. Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 12, at 1243.
228. Alexander, supra note 5, at 819.

229. While Pefialver, for example, admits that his virtue theory does not provide a full account "of
the proper roles of legislatures, courts, administrative agencies, and individual citizens in wise land use
decision making," see Pefialver, supra note 12, at 888, he is clear that "exclusive reliance on an
aggregated system of taxation and monetary payments will be inadequate," see id. at 882. Alexander
and Singer also do not directly address the means by which redistribution should occur, but both
praise judicial, as well as regulatory, efforts to promote more just distribution of opportunities. See
Singer, supra note 12, at 1055 (citing laws, judicial doctrines, and private agreements that promote
equal opportunity); Alexander, supra note 5, at 775-810 (using examples from both case law and
legislation).
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and if property is not producing the right kind of relationships, then
quick action is needed. Older is not necessarily better, and stability is not
necessarily more desirable than change.
IV. CONTESTED METAPHORICAL COMMITMENTS
Let us take stock: There are large areas of agreement between
information and progressive theorists-for example, that property is a
system, and that it orders social relations. But there are disagreements,
too. The information theorists' understanding of how it is that property
functions logistically puts a premium on simple signals, but the
progressive theorists' interest in direct consideration of plural values may
be inconsistent with such simplicity. Information theorists value stability,
and favor legislative over judicial changes, precisely because the former
tend to come slowly. Progressive theorists, for their part, focus on ends,
and they value change designed to achieve desired goals. Relatively
speaking, progressive theorists are indifferent to the institution
producing that change; certainly, they are far more receptive to judicial
efforts aimed at redistribution than the information theorists.
Interestingly, both the information and progressive theorists
currently see the central points of contention in terms of "core" and
"periphery."2 30 One might think that if the two theoretical strands could
agree on the appropriateness of the core/periphery metaphor, they would
agree on the content of the core, but the opposite is true. In Smith's view,
"property's core is a right to things against the world, which is a rough
cut at dealing with a wide, indefinite, and open-ended set of problems by
delegating decisions over the use of property to owners who have better
information about it."23 ' At the periphery is "governance," used "[w]here
problems are important enough" and require "more tailored
solutions... that make more direct reference to the ends that we
collectively want to see served."" But for Singer, for example, property's
core is "the shape and quality of human relationships,"2 the "qualitative
character of social relationships."234 This core, Alexander explains, "is

230. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property, supra note 15, at 359 (describing "core
property rights"); Merrill & Smith, Morality of Property,supra note 13, at 1850 (describing exclusion
as a "core aspect of property"); Smith, supra note 168, at 971 ("At its core, property draws on an
everyday morality that it is wrong to steal and violate others' exclusion rights."). Alexander's reply to
critiques of The Social-Obligation Norm is entitled The Complex Core of Property. See Alexander,
supra note 4. But see supra note 6.
231. Smith, supra note 168, at 964.
232. Id. at 964-65.
233. Singer, supra note 12, at xo50.
234. Id. at 'o54; see also Alexander, supra note 5, at 748 (arguing that although "[t]he law has
relegated the social obligations of owners to the margins, while individual rights, such as the right to
exclude, have occupied the center stage," this picture should be changed).
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complex, certainly more complex than the simple image of the virtually
absolute right to exclude."2 35
To both sides, this contest over the core is to some extent empirical,
a question of the characteristics of property in the real world. Thus,
Singer argues that "it is not really true that the estates system currently
functions to simplify things.'236 There are few limits, he argues,
on the kinds of conditions and covenants that can be imposed on land
ownership.... [T]he widespread use of homeowners associations
means that buyers of land must search the voluminous covenants,
conditions, and restrictions contained in the recorded declaration[s], as
well as the governing rules of the association, to find out what their
rights will be if they buy the property.2 37
In the end, Singer directly contradicts the information theorists by
asserting that "it is not clear how our estates system actually lowers
information costs at all. "23
The contest over the core is also, in the theorists' eyes, a contest
about the moral vision underlying property. The information theorists
have little doubt that their vision of property is moral and accords with
widely held moral intuitions:
The nature of property as a coordination device among unconnected
and anonymous actors, mediated through stereotyped things, requires
that property rights command widespread respect. This respect can
only be provided by some version of morality that treats violations of
possession, theft, trespasses, and other gross interferences with
property as wrongs subject to widespread disapprobation.3
Here again, the core/periphery metaphor is called into play: Smith argues
that "at its core, property draws on an everyday morality that it is wrong
to steal and violate others' exclusion rights."240 Not so, say the
progressive theorists. "[I]t may well overstate the case," Singer states, "to
identify simplification with common morality.... Common morality
often sides with complexity rather than simplicity."2 4' Alexander goes
even further. He writes: "Common moral intuitions extend significantly
beyond injunctions against theft and trespass. They include perceived
obligations to share and conserve, at least at times. Hence, pace Smith,
qualifications on the right to exclude are not deviations from core moral
intuitions underlying property, but rather expressions of those moral
intuitions.",242

235. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1o64236. Singer, supra note 12, at 1025.
237. Id.

238. Id. at 1026. This statement obviously qualifies Singer's acceptance of the numerus clausus
principle.
239. Merrill & Smith, Morality of Property, supra note 13, at 1852-53.
240. Smith, supra note '68, at 971.
241. Singer, supra note 12, at 1o26 (footnote omitted).
242. Alexander, supra note 4, at io66.
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It is not clear how one would resolve the conflicting empirical and
moral claims raised by the information and progressive theorists. What is
clear is that alongside the consensus on the core/periphery metaphor,
there is yet another unacknowledged dispute between the theoretical
strands. This dispute concerns the proper conceptualization of what
property theory should do, and returns us to the question with which this
Article began, about how property organizes human behavior and social
life.
Information theorists' interest is in the functional mechanics of the
property system, in the way that property operates as a means to an end.
Again, recall property is a system, a "mechanism."4 ' Systems have a
design; the goal, in the eyes of the information theorists, is to understand
the design and, perhaps, improve upon it. This inquiry is, in Smith's
words, an "engineering-like" question." But, he adds, "if there is
anything legal scholars do better than economists, social scientists, and
philosophers, it is institutional design.... We should embrace our
role. "9245
But not everyone wants to be an engineer-at least, not the kind
worried about the mechanics of the system. Progressive theorists care
about social ordering, but to the extent that the metaphor of engineering
suggests nuts-and-bolts type inquiries into systems design, it does not
really capture their concerns. In their eyes, "choices about property law
are choices about social and political structure"'246 and require judgments
about the degree to which ownership "foster[s] the participation by
human beings in ... objectively valuable patterns of existence and
interaction."" Diagnosing property regimes involves "consider[ing]
whether
they
promote
relationships
of
domination
and
subordination . . . or whether, alternatively, they promote reciprocity and
cultivate the habit of recognizing and pursuing one's own interests and
commitments in the course of negotiating cooperation with others."
Perhaps these concerns could be made to fit within the
"engineering" metaphor. One could see the progressive theorists as
concerned with social engineering, broadly understood as the
configuration of the virtuous, free, or democratic society. Yet this is
clearly not the sort of engineering Smith has in mind; his concerns are
practical, 9 focusing on the management of complexity, and envisioning

243. Smith repeatedly uses the "mechanism" metaphor. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 168, at 973,
975, 976.
244. Id. at 970.
245. Id.

246. Singer, supra note 12, at 1059.

Alexander, supra note 5, at 764.
248. Purdy, A Freedom-PromotingApproach, supra note 12, at I1244-45.
249. See Smith, supra note i68, at 970 (using the term "practicality").
247.
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actual solutions.250 The judgments that need to be made here are
empirical, not qualitative.2 5'
The information theorists' metaphors suggest one vision of
property. In this view, property is a machine, one that, as we see through
the numerus clausus principle, has been running more or less on its own
from long ago until now, and one that is best left alone (at least by
courts) to keep on running. Property is a mechanism that promotes
human flourishing; it has an "architecture"252 we should struggle to
understand and to retain. Ultimately, property is "infrastructure." 253 In
the eyes of the information theorists, the system is running pretty well,
producing a fair amount of social order in an unseen, background sort of
way, especially when compared to societies that lack this machine.2M
While the progressive theorists are willing to concede that the
current property system prevents some social pathologies,'55 they contest
the premise that the system is working pretty well. Or perhaps it is more
accurate to say that the progressive theorists would put on the table
explicitly the question whether the system is working well enough. More
importantly, they would also put on the table what "well enough" might
mean. The idea that there might be a "mechanism" for the attainment of
goals as complex as freedom, democracy, or human flourishing is one
they continually reject.256 Whereas for the information theorists property
is something-machine ("mechanism") or system ("architecture") or
structure ("infrastructure")-that runs to some extent independent of us,
for the progressive theorists property never just is. Whether a particular
property right arises or governs at all-the scope of every property
right-will, and should, always depend on the social relations, the duties,
the dependencies, (etc.) to which that right might give rise. From the
placement of political signs to the resolution of the mortgage foreclosure
crisis, the issue is not whether we obtain clear answers, but whether we
"frame the issue appropriately" and "ask the right questions.", 57
Is property a machine or a conversation? Is it something that
already is or something we create every day? Does it work on its own, or

250. Id. at 969 ("Property law provides the overall structure to manage ... complexity.. .,but the
need to manage complexity points to the need, at least in theory, for a modular solution.").
251. Id. ("Ultimately, what degree and kind of modularization we need is an empirical question.").

Id. at 967, 973.
253. Id. at 974.
254. Id. at 970 (using the example of North Korea).
255. See Singer, supra note 12, at IO5or ("We tend to forget this fundamental purpose of the estates
252.

system [outlawing certain prohibited social and political relationships] because custom has evolved so
that no one seeks to create feudal or slave relationships today.").
256. See. e.g.. id. at 1059 ("There are various ways to think through and justify alternative
resolutions" to difficult property questions, but "none of them gives us a mechanical decision
procedure to generate an outcome.").
257. Id. at lo6r.
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does it need constant attention? These questions are all metaphorical,
yet they imply very different visions of how property works as a social
ordering device. Both visions are attractive in some ways. It is, for
example, comforting to believe that we live in a pretty good social world,
while it is also natural to want to believe that we might always make that
social world better (whatever "better" might mean). But the
commitments underlying the two visions are hard to reconcile. One
suggests our social world is already in reasonably good shape, and that
changes that might destabilize existing ownership rights are perilous. The
other suggests that our social world needs attention, and that the status
quo-including the extant distribution of property-must continually
and directly be challenged. Since we care about how property works, we
need to attend to these contested commitments and the choices they
require us to make. What is at stake, in the end, is whether we can trust
property to make us better off.
CONCLUSION

As Carol Rose has persuasively argued, it is often the choice of
rhetoric, not rule, that matters most, communicating our deeper
commitments with respect to human interaction.25' The rhetoric of
exclusion and the metaphor of core and periphery have for some time
dominated thinking about property and seem likely to structure the
debate well into the future. This Article has shown that a different
metaphorical contest more accurately defines modern property law, the
contest between the metaphors of machine and conversation.
The machine and conversation metaphors encode the commitments
contested between the information and progressive theoristscommitments that connect to our fundamental understanding of how
property creates social order. The commitments encoded in the machine
metaphor emphasize the functional, mechanical aspects of property, the
way it works nearly invisibly to produce high levels of social coordination
at low cost. The commitments encoded in the conversation metaphor
emphasize the ends, particularly the quality of relationships, that our
property system produces, and it seeks to keep the question of the
quality of these ends always in view.
This metaphorical contest is important doctrinally because it reflects
conflicting views about whether we can ever unreflectively trust property
rules to express our values. Machine and conversation also suggest very
different visions of how much faith we should have in our existing system
of property, of whether it is good enough, and of whether we can trust
ourselves to improve it. Machine and conversation matter, most of all,

258. See Rose, supra note

163, at 58o.
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because they force us to choose between different visions of how
property organizes human behavior and social life.
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